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REAL INTEREST  RATES in the United States have reached  extremely  high 
levels in the last several years. This surge in real rates at all maturities 
has not lacked explanations. Large current and prospective deficits, 
tight money, better profit prospects, financial deregulation, and in- 
creased uncertainty  are among the factors that have been blamed  for 
high real rates. If one looks only at the performance  of the U.S. bond 
market,  it is difficult  to discriminate  among  possible explanations  for the 
behavior of real interest rates. This paper examines the worldwide 
behavior  of interest rates and the performance  of other asset markets 
besides the U.S. bond market  in order  to better  explain  high  real  rates. 
Even a cursory inspection of the data makes it clear that high real 
rates  are a worldwide  phenomenon.  In nearly  all the major  countries  of 
the Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD), 
real interest rates on  both short- and long-term bonds have risen 
dramatically.  This is not surprising.  Interest  rates  today  are  substantially 
determined  worldwide, rather  than domestically, because a large pool 
of capital  flows toward  nations  with high real rates, tending  to equalize 
rates  around  the world. Thus, it is appropriate  to relate  national  interest 
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rates  to international  events, a connection  that  has long  been recognized 
by economists  living  in small, open economies. But most discussions  of 
U.S. interest rates entirely ignore international  developments. Given 
that high real rates are a worldwide  phenomenon,  we seek an account 
that can explain high real rates in all countries  rather  than only in the 
United States. 
A surprising  feature of the recent period of high real rates has been 
the relatively strong performance  of stock markets  around  the world. 
One would expect that a sharp increase in real interest rates at long 
maturities,  caused by fiscal and  monetary  policies, would depress stock 
prices significantly.  Yet in all major  countries, real stock prices have 
been surprisingly  strong.  Dividend-price  ratios  have in no way followed 
real rates on long-term  bonds. Clearly a full understanding  of recent 
events requires  some explanation  of the behavior  of stock prices, and 
we try to account  below for the behavior  of both bond  and stock prices. 
We begin by reviewing the behavior  of real interest rates and asset 
pri'ces  over the last several  years. Measuring  real  interest  rates  precisely 
is not possible, because they depend  on the level of expected inflation, 
which is not observable. We use alternative  approaches  to describing 
the term structure  of real rates for a number  of countries. The results 
indicate that real rates are expected to remain  high for some time to 
come. There  is some evidence suggesting  that  real  rates  are expected to 
return  eventually  toward  lower levels. We consider  the performance  of 
stock markets in the United States and abroad and document their 
surprising  strength  in the face of high  real  rates. 
In the second section of the paper, we discuss theoretically the 
determination  of real interest  rates, stock prices, and exchange  rates in 
the short  and  long run. Four  possible causes of increases  in real  interest 
rates are examined: reductions in saving, increases in profitability, 
contractionary  monetary  policies, and portfolio  shifts. In each case we 
characterize  the effects of the change on the different  asset markets.  It 
is apparent  from our discussion that ascribing  high  real interest  rates to 
only one cause will not fit  the  facts. The  pattern  of asset price  movements 
that has been observed in recent years does not correspond to the 
predicted  effects of any single type of shock. The next four sections of 
the paper  then examine  in turn  the empirical  importance  of each type of 
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Since deficits  are probably  the most commonly  adduced  explanation 
for high  worldwide  real  rates, we start  with an analysis  of fiscal  policy in 
the major  nations  of the OECD. The much-ballyhooed  fiscal expansion 
has indeed taken place in the United States, but it has been offset to a 
significant  extent by contractions  in other nations. The total inflation- 
adjusted  structural  deficit for the major  nations of the OECD has not 
changed significantly  between 1978 and 1984. It seems quite unlikely 
that the direct effects of fiscal expansion can account for the dramatic 
increases in real rates that have been observed. We briefly examine 
other possible causes of a worldwide  decline in saving  but find  little to 
explain  the behavior  of real interest  rates. 
The second hypothesis is that rates have increased  because of a rise 
in the current  or prospective demand  for investment  funds. If correct, 
this hypothesis has the virtue  of explaining  why stock prices have risen 
as well as why interest  rates  have increased.  In addition  to the recovery, 
the demand  for investment  funds  may  have risen  because  of the business 
tax cuts enacted in the United States and the reductions  in uncertainty 
associated  with an increase  in the "inflation  consciousness" of govern- 
ments  around  the world. We explore  these hypotheses  by examining  the 
recent performance  of investment. Overall, the evidence supports  the 
hypothesis  that  expected profitability  has increased  by more  than  might 
be expected from  cyclical factors. 
The third  possible cause, tight  money, may well be a major  culprit  in 
explaining  high long-term  real rates. A great deal of evidence confirms 
that monetary  policies were extremely  tight  durihg  the 1978-82  period, 
and there are substantial  reasons to believe that monetary  policies can 
affect even long real rates. Thus it seems natural  to blame much of the 
initial  increase in real rates on tight  money. However, the current  level 
of rates is less easy to link to tight money. Tight  money cannot be the 
only  culprit.  We examine  whether  the mix  of fiscal  and  monetary  policies 
can  explain  high  rates. We find  some plausibility  to an explanation  based 
on "loose U.S. fiscal policy, tight European  money" or "loose U.S. 
fiscal  policy, tight  anticipated  world  money." 
Concerning  the last potential  cause, the effects of portfolio  shifts  that 
stem  from  changes  in asset supplies  or risk  characteristics,  we find  little 
reason  to believe that  such shifts  are  responsible  for the high  level of real 
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for the problems  of forecasting  future  developments  and making  future 
policy. 
Asset Prices and Asset Returns 
Because one  needs evidence on a variety of  assets in different 
countries to assess explanations of current high rates in the United 
States, this section examines  the behavior  of asset prices and  returns  in 
six major  OECD  countries-the  United  States, France,  West  Germany, 
the United Kingdom,  Italy, and Japan,  which accounted  for 89 percent 
of total OECD gross national  product in 1983. We first present time 
series for short and medium-term  real rates and then examine the 
behavior  of stock prices and  the required  return  on equity. 
REAL  INTEREST  RATES 
We  present  estimates  of real  short  rates  in tables 1  and  2. The nominal 
rates for the period 1978-84 are three-month  Eurorates  for five of the 
six countries;  for Italy  we use a domestic  rate  rather  than  the unreliable 
Eurolira  rate. Nominal rates for the period 1965-77 are domestic short 
rates. In table 1  we construct  real  rates  for 1965-84  by creating  statistical 
forecasts  of inflation  based  on  forecasts  from  an  estimated  autoregressive 
process of inflation.  Because we suspect that the inflation  process and, 
therefore,  the autoregressive  representation  of inflation  have probably 
changed  over time, we use rolling  autoregressive  forecasts,  reestimating 
the process each period on the basis of the last twenty-four  quarters. 
Even so, our forecasts of inflation  from 1982 onward usually exceed 
other official or commercial  forecasts, which suggests that the decline 
in expected inflation was more rapid than can be captured by our 
statistical  method. In table 2 we construct  real  rates  for the first  quarter 
of each year from 1978  to 1984  by using the previous December's DRI 
(Data Resources, Inc.) forecast of inflation  and, for 1984:2,  their April 
forecast. The real  rates so constructed  are  in general  higher  for the latter 
part  of the sample  period  because the expected rate  of inflation  is lower. 
Before discussing them, we turn to the construction  of medium-term 
real  rates and rates of return  on equity. 
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Table 1.  Real Short-Term Interest Rates Using Statistical Forecasts of Inflation, 
1965-84:2a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1965-72  1.5  1.7  3.0  1.5  n.a.  1.0 
1973-77  1.5  -0.3  1.4  - 3.9  - 2.5  - 3.3 
1978  0.3  0.7  0.8  -0.9  -2.5  -5.0 
1979  1.3  -0.7  1.2  -4.3  -4.4  0.4 
1980  0.4  0.3  3.2  0.9  0.0  3.4 
1981  7.0  3.6  6.0  1.1  2.0  1.7 
1982  6.5  4.9  3.8  1.5  2.8  2.7 
1983  4.7  4.5  1.4  2.3  3.2  2.9 
1984:1  4.6  4.0  2.6  1.4  3.4  4.6 
1984:2  5.4  1.5  3.0  1.7  n.a.  6.1 
Source:  Nominal  interest  rates  for 1965-77,  International  Monetary  Fund,  International Financial  Statistics,  vol. 
34 (October  1984)  and previous  issues, line 60c for the United States and the United Kingdom;  line 60b for the 
others;  for 1978-84, Data Resources, Inc. Inflation  series, constructed  as explained  in the text, based on IMF, 
International Financial  Statistics,  line 64. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Nominal  interest  rates  for 1965-77  are the Treasury  bill rate  for the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  and 
the call money  rates  for the others;  for 1978-84,  a domestic  rate for Italy and the three-month  Eurocurrency  rates 
for the others. Inflation  is the expected rate of change  of the CPI from the first month  of the quarter  to the first 
month  of the next quarter  based  on forecasts  from  an estimated  autoregressive  process.  Annual  values  are averages 
of quarterly  data. 
nominal  rates  with which  we start  are yields to maturity  on public  bonds 
of five- to seven-year  maturities  for most countries. We then construct 
real  rates by defining 
( 1)  Rk  k  -(I 
_ 
g  ) 
k-  I 
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The variables  R  k and Ik are the real and nominal rates on a bond of 
maturity  k, and nt,t+i  is the forecast  of inflation  in period  t +  i, as of time 
t. The variable  I is the mean nominal  rate over the period  we examine. 
Thus  the real  rate  so defined  is equal  to the nominal  rate  minus  a weighted 
average of expected inflation  over the life of the bond. In table 3, we 
report  real  rates  constructed  using  statistical  forecasts  obtained  with the 
same  method  used in table 1. In this case, however,  we use the estimated 
autoregressive  process to generate  inflation  forecasts  over the life of the 
bond, not just one period ahead. The rates in table 4 are constructed 
using  DRI  forecasts of inflation. 
Constructing  long real rates would require constructing  expected 
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Table  2. Short-Term  Nominal  and Real Interest  Rates  Using  DRI Forecasts 
of Inflation,  1978:1-84:2a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period  and measure  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1978:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  6.5  8.9  3.6  5.8  11.1  4.8 
Inflation  rate  6.2  10.1  4.5  10.5  10.1  6.9 
Real interest  rate  0.3  -1.2  -0.9  -4.7  1.0  -2.1 
1979:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  9.4  6.6  3.9  11.9  11.3  4.3 
Inflation  rate  8.8  12.5  2.6  12.7  13.5  4.5 
Real interest  rate  0.6  -5.9  1.3  -0.8  -2.2  -0.2 
1980:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  12.0  12.0  8.9  15.8  16.4  8.1 
Inflation  rate  12.0  12.0  6.2  14.8  16.1  7.7 
Real interest  rate  0.0  0.0  2.7  1.0  0.3  0.4 
1981:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  14.7  10.7  9.5  12.9  17.6  8.9 
Inflation  rate  13.9  12.2  3.5  9.0  18.5  6.2 
Real interest  rate  0.8  -1.5  6.0  3.9  -0.9  2.7 
1982:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  12.4  15.2  10.5  14.1  20.9  6.6 
Inflation  rate  6.6  13.7  3.7  9.9  15.4  3.9 
Real interest  rate  5.8  1.5  6.8  4.2  5.5  2.7 
1983:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  7.8  12.7  5.8  10.6  19.3  6.6 
Inflation  rate  4.9  12.3  1.2  5.2  12.9  2.7 
Real interest  rate  2.9  0.4  4.6  5.4  6.4  3.9 
1984:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  8.9  12.4  6.1  8.9  18.1  6.1 
Inflation  rate  3.7  7.5  1.2  5.4  14.5  1.0 
Real interest  rate  5.2  4.9  4.9  3.5  3.6  5.1 
1984:2 
Nominal  interest  rate  9.7  12.2  5.8  8.4  17.7  5.9 
Inflation  rate  5.1  6.8  2.0  7.4  12.5  1.8 
Real interest  rate  4.6  5.4  3.8  1.0  5.2  4.1 
Source:  Nominal  interest  rates, same as table 1; inflation  forecasts,  DRI. 
a. Inflation  rate  is the December  forecast  of CPI  inflation  for the following  quarter,  with  the exception  of 1984:2, 
for which  the April  forecast  was used. 
twenty years. We thought  it would be unwise to attempt  such construc- 
tion; but we shall examine evidence on long rates in a less formal  way 
below. 
The clear  conclusion  is that  of a large  increase  in real  rates  on bonds  in 
all countries. Tables 1 and 3, constructed using statistical forecasts, 
imply that the average short real rate increased by 460 basis points 
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Table  3. Medium-Term  Real Interest  Rates  Using  Statistical  Forecasts 
of Inflation, 1965-84:2a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1965-72  1.4  3.1  4.0  2.2  3.3  1.3 
1973-77  -0.9  n.a.  1.3  n.a)  n.a.  n.a. 
1978  0.2  0.4  3.2  -3.0  -1.4  -4.8 
1979  0.0  -0.2  3.9  -3.3  - 2.1  -1.2 
1980  -0.2  2.5  3.9  -1.8  -0.1  2.6 
1981  4.2  2.0  5.4  0.3  3.1  2.9 
1982  4.5  2.9  4.1  0.6  3.7  3.5 
1983  5.4  3.0  3.4  1.0  2.2  3.7 
1984:1  4.6  2.7  3.6  1.5  1.3  3.5 
1984:2  6.1  2.2  1.2  3.4  0.3  4.2 
Source:  Nominal  interest  rates  for  France,  West  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States,  Organization 
for Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  OECD Financial  Statistics,  line 112bl;  for Italy,  line 112b2;  for Japan, 
IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  line 61. Inflation  rate, constructed  as explained  in the text, from IMF, 
International Financial  Statistics,  line 64. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Nominal  interest  rates  are  as follows:  United  States  and  United  Kingdom,  government  bonds,  secondary  market, 
five-year  maturity;  France,  bond  yield, secondary  market,  ten-or-more-years  maturity;  West  Germany,  public  bonds, 
secondary  market,  three-to-seven-year  maturity;  Italy, "crediop"  bonds,  five-year  average  maturity;  Japan,  govern- 
ment  bond  yield, secondary  market,  seven-year  maturity.  Expected  inflation  was constructed  as in table 1, but the 
forecasts  were made  over the entire  life of the bond, assuming  maturities  of twenty  quarters  for the United  States, 
West Germany,  the United Kingdom,  and Italy, twenty-eight  quarters  for Japan,  and forty quarters  for France. 
Annual  values  are averages  of quarterly  data. 
b. Expected  inflation  could not be computed  because  the estimated  autoregressions  were unstable  for part  of the 
period. 
rose by 380  points in the same  period. Tables  2 and  4, constructed  using 
DRI forecasts, imply an average increase of 520 basis points in short 
rates and an average increase of 270 points in the medium-term  rate 
(which  excludes Japan).  However, these averages  hide  important  differ- 
ences both across periods  and across countries. 
Two distinct  periods emerge  from the tables. The first, from 1978  to 
1982, is one of sharp increases in real rates. From tables 2 and 4 one 
derives for this first period an average increase of 560 basis points for 
short rates and 360 points for medium-term  rates. The second period, 
from 1982 on, is one of high but slightly declining rates. The data in 
tables 2 and 4 for this second period  indicate  an average  decrease of 40 
basis points  for short  rates and  90 points  for medium-term  rates. 
There  is also a clear  difference  between  the experiences  of the United 
States and of Europe. The increase in U.S.  rates is much more pro- 
nounced than the increase in European  rates. Table 4 shows that the 
U.S. increase is 490 basis points for medium-term  rates from 1978  to 
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Table  4. Medium-Term  Nominal  and Real Interest  Rates  Using  DRI Forecasts 
of Inflation,  1978:1-84:2a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period and measure  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy 
1978:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  7.7  11.2  5.4  9.5  14.1 
Inflation  rate  5.5  8.8  4.0  9.4  9.6 
Real interest  rate  2.2  2.4  1.4  0.1  4.5 
1979:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  9.4  9.7  6.2  13.5  13.7 
Inflation  rate  7.3  9.8  3.8  9.0  12.6 
Real interest  rate  2.1  -0.1  2.4  4.5  1.1 
1980:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  10.8  12.5  3.1  14.9  14.8 
Inflation  rate  9.8  9.3  4.8  10.8  12.9 
Real interest  rate  1.0  3.2  3.3  4.1  1.9 
1981:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  12.8  14.6  9.1  13.3  17.0 
Inflation  rate  10.6  10.7  4.2  11.2  15.2 
Real interest  rate  2.2  3.9  4.9  2.1  1.8 
1982:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  14.6  16.4  9.9  16.4  21.0 
Inflation  rate  7.7  13.1  4.2  11.1  13.6 
Real interest  rate  6.9  3.3  5.7  5.3  7.4 
1983:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  10.0  15.0  7.5  11.4  19.9 
Inflation  rate  5.7  8.7  3.5  9.1  14.8 
Real interest  rate  4.3  6.3  4.0  2.3  5.1 
1984:1 
Nominal  interest  rate  11.4  13.8  8.1  10.7  16.6 
Inflation  rate  4.9  8.7  4.2  7.4  12.8 
Real interest  rate  6.5  5.1  3.9  3.3  3.8 
1984:2 
Nominal  interest  rate  12.4  13.8  7.7  10.5  15.4 
Inflation  rate  5.3  8.0  4.4  6.2  11.8 
Real interest  rate  7.1  5.8  3.3  4.3  3.6 
Source:  Nominal  interest  rates, same as table  3; inflation  forecasts,  DRI. 
a. Inflation  rate is the forecast as of the month  preceding  the quarter.  Forecast  of inflation  for Japan  was not 
available. 
Table 3 shows U.S.  rates in 1981-84 to be high compared  with their 
average value during  either 1965-72 or 1973-77, while European  rates 
are not far from their 1965-72 values. Indeed, one of the surprising 
results of table 3 is the relative constancy of the German  medium-term Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  281 
real  rate  throughout  the 1965-84 period. We have excluded  Japan  from 
this  comparison;  medium-term  rates  there  are  high  compared  with 1965- 
72; the earlier  period is, however, one of tight financial  control, and 
interest  rates  during  that  period  imperfectly  reflect  market  forces. 
There  are  two major  characteristics  of current  interest  rates.  The first 
is that U.S. real rates are now higher  than elsewhere. Tables 2 and 4 
show that  real short  rates are at 4.6 percent  for the United States versus 
3.8 percent  for Europe and 4.1 percent  for Japan;  real long rates are at 
7.1 percent  for the United States versus 4.2 percent  for Europe. 
The second characteristic  is that medium-term  real rates are at least 
as high  as short  rates. Can  we say anything  about  long real  rates?  There 
is fortunately  some market  information  that obviates the need for long- 
run  inflation  forecasts. Since 1981,  indexed  bonds have been issued by 
the British  government,  and the market  for them has been open to the 
public since 1982. Table 5, which gives some information  on the yield 
curve of these bonds for various  dates and various  maturities,  suggests 
two conclusions. The first  conclusion,  which  confirms  the earlier  tables, 
is that  real  interest  rates  have risen significantly  in Britain  between 1982 
and  the present  at all maturities.  However, the second  conclusion  is that 
long rates have increased by less than short or medium-term  rates. 
Computing  implicit  forward  rates as of June 1984,  we get a current  four- 
year rate of 5.13 percent, an implicit eight-year rate in 1988 of 3.58 
percent, and an implicit ten-year rate in 1996 of 3.00 percent. To the 
extent that this indexed bond market is not too idiosyncratic, this 
evidence is  consistent with the view that real rates are eventually 
expected to decline.  I 
STOCK  PRICES  AND  EQUITY  RETURNS 
Figure 1 shows 1970-84 real stock prices, and table  6 shows 1965-84 
dividend-price  ratios. Dividend-price  ratios  are only crude  measures  of 
expected rates of return on equities, because they do not take into 
1. Although  indexed  bonds  do not yet exist in the United  States  on a large  scale, First 
City  National  Bank  of Houston  introduced  in  October  1984  a thirty-year  indexed  certificate 
of deposit.  It pays 4 percent,  thus suggesting  high  long real  rates in the United  States as 
well.  The  current  term  structure  of nominal  rates  in the United  States  is approximately  flat 
for  maturities  equal  to or longer  than  five years,  a characteristic  shared  by term  structures 
at the same stage of the four previous  recoveries. Whether  real long rates are higher  or 
lower  than  real  medium-term  rates therefore  depends  on whether  inflation  is expected  to 
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Table 5.  Real Yields on British Indexed Bonds,  1981-84 
Percent 
Year  of maturity 
Period  1988  1996  2006  2011 
1981 
June  ...  2.37  ...  ... 
September  . . .  3.13  2.90  ... 
December  . . .  3.17  2.92  ... 
1982 
March  2.69  2.86  2.71  2.70 
June  2.96  3.14  2.95  2.93 
September  3.48  3.18  2.95  2.90 
December  2.52  2.90  2.72  2.71 
1983 
March  3.01  2.79  2.61  2.60 
June  4.18  3.46  3.04  2.97 
September  3.41  3.40  3.15  3.04 
December  3.73  3.54  3.14  3.09 
1984 
March  4.62  3.78  3.33  3.25 
June  5.13  4.10  3.60  3.52 
Source:  W. Greenwell  and Company,  "British  Funds," in Z. Bodie and James Poterba,  "The British  Indexed 
Bond  Market." 
account either cyclical movements or trend growth  in dividends. This 
leads us to go one step further.  We define  the real  required  rate  of return 
on equity in period  t, E,, implicitly  by the relation 
00 
(2)  Pt = E  (I +Et)-i Dtt+i, 
i=O 
where  Pt is the real stock price  and  D, ,+ i is the real  dividend  expected at 
time t in period t + i. The variable  E, may be interpreted  as an internal 
rate of return. If dividends are expected to grow for cyclical or trend 
reasons,  E, will be higher  than  the current  dividend-price  ratios.  The rate 
E, can be thought of as a "cyclically adjusted  dividend-price  ratio." 
Computing  E, requires  forecasting  the sequence of expected dividends 
at time t. We do this by estimating  rolling  bivariate  autoregressions  for 
P and  D for each t for the last twenty-four  quarters  and generating  for 
each t forecasts of expected dividends.  We use a bivariate  rather  than  a 
univariate  autoregression,  as we did in projecting  inflation  above, to Figure 1.  Real Stock Prices,  1970-84a 
Source:  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  OECD  Financial  Statistics, various  issues. 
Data  for West  Germany  extend  to 1984:  1;  for others, 1983:4. 
a. Index, 1976:1  =  1.0. Deflators  are the domestic  CPI. 284  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Table  6. Dividend-Price  Ratios, 1965-84:2a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1965-72  3.2  3.8b  3.6  4.5  4.1  n.a. 
1973-77  4.0  6.2  3.6  5.9  3.9  2.0 
1978  5.3  6.6  4.5  5.5  5.1  1.6 
1979  5.5  5.7  5.0  5.7  3.4  1.4 
1980  5.2  6.2  5.7  6.7  2.5  1.5 
1981  5.2  8.1  5.7  6.1  2.0  1.4 
1982  5.8  7.9  5.5  5.6  2.2  1.6 
1983  4.4  6.6  3.9  4.7  2.4  1.3 
1984:1  4.5  5.1  3.2  4.3  2.6  1.1 
1984:2  4.7  5.0  n.a.  4.0  2.4  1.0 
Source:  OECD Financial  Statistics. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. Values  for 1984:1  and 1984:2  are for the first  month  of the quarter. 
b. Adjusted  for income  tax credit. 
allow for the possibility that stock prices contain information  not 
contained  in current  and past dividends.  Results are presented  in table 
7. It is useful to note that  they are  very similar  to those of table  6. This is 
because the dividend  process turns  out to be close to a random  walk, so 
that forecasts of future dividends are approximately  equal to current 
dividends. For the United States, a bivariate autoregression using 
dividends  and  earnings  instead  of dividends  and  prices  gives very similar 
results. 
Figure 1 gives the behavior of stock markets during  the 1970-84 
period. Qualitatively,  the behavior  is not surprising.  Except for Japan, 
the 1978-82 period, which we have shown above to be one of sharply 
increasing  real interest rates, is also one of declining  real stock prices. 
The period starting  in 1982,  which is characterized  by slightly  declining 
long rates and various degrees of economic recovery, is one of sharp 
stock price  increases. However, table  6 shows that  dividend-price  ratios 
are uniformly  lower in 1984:2  than in 1978  across all countries. Also, 
required  returns  (table  7), which can be thought  of as cyclically  adjusted 
dividend-price  ratios, mostly show no increase in these ratios  between 
1978  and 1984. This is surprising  in light of the sharp  increases in the 
required  real  rates of return  on bonds during  the period. 
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Table  7. Required  Real Rates  of Return  on Equities,  1978-84:1a 
Percent 
United  States 
Using  Using  West  United 
Period  prices  earnings  France  Germany  Kingdom  Japan 
1978  4.3  4.3  6.2  3.4  4.9  1.1 
1979  4.7  4.4  5.2  4.0  4.8  1.2 
1980  4.8  4.6  5.1  4.6  5.4  1.5 
1981  5.1  4.6  6.1  5.4  5.4  1.5 
1982  5.1  5.2  6.7  5.0  5.4  1.5 
1983  4.2  4.2  5.9  4.3  4.6  1.8 
1984:1  4.3  4.3  5.2  2.6  4.8  1.6 
Source:  Calculations,  as described  in text, based  on data  from  OECD Financial  Statistics. 
a. Forecasts  for dividends,  DI, +j, are obtained  by generating  forecasts  at t for i periods  ahead  from  a bivariate 
autoregression  (4) for dividends,  D,  and prices,  P, based on the last twenty-four  quarters.  The variables  DI and PI 
are not included  in the information  set at t. The U.S. series was calculated  with dividends  and earnings  as well as 
dividends  and prices. The prediction  equation  for Italy was unstable  and is not reported.  Values  for 1978-83  are 
annual  averages  of quarterly  estimates. 
rates on bonds, it is useful to start with the following relation that is 
implied  by arbitrage  between bonds and stocks: 
(3)  DIP  =  R  +  -y -x, 
where DIP is the dividend-price  ratio, R is the long real rate on bonds, 
Sy  is the risk  premium  required  by portfolio  holders  to hold  equities  rather 
than  long bonds, and  x is the expected rate  of growth  of real  dividends.2 
If both Sy  and  x were equal  to zero, DIP would  equal  R. If  x and -y  had  not 
changed  from 1978  to 1984:2,  DIP and R would have moved together; 
the divergent movements of DIP and R imply that either -y  or x has 
changed.  Using 1978  and 1984:2  values for R from  table 4 and values of 
DIP from  table 6, we get for the United States 
(4)  (Y78 -  X78) -  (Y84  -  X84)  =  [(D/P)78  -  R78] -  [(DIP)84  -  R84] 
=  5.5 percent. 
2. This relation  can be derived  as a first-order  approximation  when portfolio  holders 
arbitrage  between assets up to given risk premiums.  See Robert J. Shiller, John Y. 
Campbell,  and Kermit  L. Schoenholtz,  "Forward  Rates and Future  Policy:  Interpreting 
the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates," BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 173-224, for a discussion  of 
such approximations  in the case of bonds. A more precise definition  of R is that  it is the 
real rate on a bond of duration  equal to that of the stock (see Shiller, Campbell,  and 
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Therefore,  if we assume that  the risk  premium  has not changed  since 
1978, average expected growth of real dividends must be 5.5 percent 
higher  in 1984  than  in 1978.  Equivalently,  if expected  growth  of dividends 
is the same in 1984  as it was in 1978,  the risk  premium  on equities must 
be 5.5 percent  lower than  in 1984.  Going  through  the same computation 
for other  countries  gives: 
France  =  5.0 percent 
West Germany  =  3.2 percent 
United Kingdom  =  5.7 percent 
Italy  =  1.8 percent 
Another way of showing the importance  of these implications  is to 
ask, What  would the value of the stock market  index be if both Sy  and x 
had not changed  over the 1978-84 period while real interest rates rose 
as they did?  Answer:  the Dow Jones  industrial  index  in the United  States 
would be equal to 555 instead of  1200! Results would be nearly as 
dramatic  for the other  countries.3 
REAL  EXCHANGE  RATES 
Table 8 presents some information  on the evolution of real exchange 
rates over the 1978-83 period. The dramatic  real appreciation  of the 
dollar since  1978 is a prominent feature of recent experience. This 
appreciation  has continued  since the end of 1983,  with the dollar  rising 
in real  terms  by 4 percent  between  December  1983  and  July 1984  relative 
to a trade-weighted  basket of other  currencies.  The substantial  appreci- 
ation  of the yen relative  to the European  currencies  is also noteworthy. 
The behavior of the dollar  provides strong  evidence against  at least 
one hypothesis  about  budget  deficits.  This  is the notion  that  U.S. deficits 
will ultimately  be monetized and lead to high rates of inflation.  If such 
an expectation  were pervasive, one would expect the dollar  to decline, 
3. Two caveats are in order  here. The conceptually  appropriate  real  rate  R is a longer 
rate  than  the medium-term  real  rate  we have used. To the extent that  the appropriate  long 
real rate has moved less, the results overstate the change in y or x. The other caveat 
concerns  the well-documented  volatility  of stock market  prices  (see, for example,  Robert 
J. Shiller,  "Stock Prices  and  Social  Dynamics,"  BPEA,  this  issue) and  the possibility  that 
stock prices increase "too much" in recoveries. To the extent that 1978  and 1984  are 
comparable  in the United  States  in terms  of their  cyclical  position,  our  computation  should 
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Table  8. Real Appreciation  of the Dollar, 1978-84:1a 
Index, 1980 =  100 
United  West  United 
Period  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1978  104.7  91.0  103.6  72.2  88.2  137.5 
1979  100.5  95.9  105.6  80.2  95.0  116.2 
1980  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1981  114.7  94.6  89.6  103.0  93.4  109.9 
1982  122.6  91.4  93.4  98.0  97.1  97.5 
1983  127.0  87.6  93.9  91.7  99.8  104.4 
1984:1  131.1  85.7  92.0  91.6  100.4  108.9 
Source:  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  series  99by 110. 
a. Effective  exchange  rates  adjusted  by deflators  for value  added  in manufacturing. 
not rise.  The  strength of the dollar confirms our conclusion  that high 
nominal rates, at least in the United States, correspond to high real rates, 
not high inflationary expectations. 
Determinants  of Real Rates 
The previous  section  documented  that real interest  rates are high 
worldwide.  This is true of short and medium-term rates and probably of 
long rates as well.  (For simplicity  we  shall refer to medium and long 
rates  in  this  section  as  long  rates;  this  does  not  mean  that  we  are 
overlooking  the  distinction  between  the  two.)  Theory  suggests  that 
several different types of change in the economic  environment can lead 
to increases in real rates. In this section we review these different types 
of change and assess  their implications  not only for real rates but for 
other asset prices as well.  This will tell us what to look for in assessing 
which  types  of  change  are  actually  responsible  for  the  high  rates. 
Although we present the different types as alternatives, it is likely that a 
combination of factors is responsible for the behavior of real rates over 
the last six years. 
As noted earlier we identify four potential explanations for high long 
real rates. In the first two, such rates portend high equilibrium real rates 
in the future. The first, rather pessimistic  explanation concentrates  on 
the role of reduced current and prospective  saving in driving up interest 
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through  budget  deficits.  The  second, more  optimistic  explanation  focuses 
on the increased  attractiveness  of investment  owing  to increased  profit- 
ability or reduced uncertainty;  in this case, an increase in the current 
and prospective demand for funds drives up interest rates. The third 
explanation  does not attribute  high  long  rates  to imbalances  in the supply 
and  demand  for  funds  but  rather  to anticipation  of sustained  tight  money. 
Under this explanation, long real rates portend a long period of high 
disequilibrium  real  rates. The  fourth  explanation  points  to the possibility 
that high rates on long bonds do not necessarily imply high expected 
short rates but may instead reflect an increase in the risk premium 
required  to hold  long  bonds. This  explanation  holds  that  changes  in asset 
prices and returns  reflect portfolio  shifts rather  than shifts in saving or 
investment. We now examine each of these four explanations  in more 
detail. 
SHIFTS  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  FUNDS 
The  first  explanation  is that  of a decline  in the current  and  prospective 
rate of saving. Such a decline can occur  for many  reasons, though  most 
current  discussions focus on public dissaving through  budget deficits. 
Analytically,  however, changes  in budget  deficits  are essentially  equiv- 
alent to other exogenous changes in saving. Thus we proceed in two 
steps, first looking at the dynamic  effects of an adverse shift in saving 
and  then returning  to the relation  of saving  to deficits. 
We  must  distinguish  between  the short-,  medium-,  and  long-run  effects 
of a saving  shift.4  The short  run  can  be analyzed  in familiar  IS-LM  terms. 
A reduction  in saving  moves the IS curve  outward,  increasing  short  rates 
as long as monetary  policy does not fully accommodate  the increase  in 
demand.  The effect on long real  rates and  other  asset prices depends  on 
expectations  of what happens  in the medium  and  long run. 
In the medium  run the economy is supply constrained,  so that the 
reduction  in saving falls entirely on real interest  rates, thereby  leading 
to the presumption  that short  real  rates increase  further.  In the long run 
the capital stock adjusts  to a new lower level, because the decrease in 
4. A formal  analysis corresponding  to the description  in the text but emphasizing 
expectations  effects is developed  in Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "Dynamic  Effects of a Shift  in 
Savings;  The Role of Firms,"  Econometrica,  vol. 51 (September  1983),  pp. 1583-91. Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  289 
saving at any level of capital and associated output implies a lower 
equilibrium  level of capital. This lower capital  stock is associated with 
higher marginal  products and thus higher interest rates. How much 
higher  interest rates will be in the long run depends on the long-run 
elasticity  of capital  demand  with respect to the interest  rate. A general 
point can be made here: very large changes in the capital stock are 
needed  to get large  changes  in interest  rates. If we assume  that  the long- 
run  production  function is approximately  Cobb-Douglas,  the long-run 
relation  between the capital output  ratio, K! Y, and the interest  rate, r, 
is given by: 
(5)  KIY= - 
r+8 
where cx  is the share of capital  and 8 the depreciation  rate. If cx  = 0.25 
and 8  =  0.07, an increase of r from 6 percent to 10 percent requires  a 
decrease in K! Yfrom 1.92 to 1.47;  a decrease of this size is outside the 
range  of historical  experience. 
How are these dynamics  modified  if the specific shift in saving  takes 
the form  of a long sequence of public  dissaving,  that  is, of fiscal  deficits? 
The budget deficit is often taken as a simple measure of the effect of 
fiscal policy on aggregate  demand  and saving.5  Such an approach  leads 
one to conclude that large deficits have a large impact on aggregate 
demand and saving, but that the impact disappears as deficits are 
eliminated.  Such  an  approach  isjustified  only  when  current  consumption 
decisions depend only on current  income, as opposed to current  and 
anticipated  income. There is, however, substantial  evidence that con- 
sumers  are at least somewhat  forward  looking.6  This has two implica- 
tions. The first is that consumers take partly into account the future 
increases in taxes implied  by current  deficits. Thus, to the extent that 
deficits  are anticipated  to decrease, looking  only at current  deficits  may 
5. This  traditional  approach  recognizes  that  the effect will vary  depending  on the type 
of change  in spending  or in taxes. It also recognizes  the endogenous  nature  of fiscal  policy 
and  focuses on full  employment  rather  than  actual  deficits. 
6. See, for example, Alan S. Blinder, "Temporary  Income Taxes and Consumer 
Spending,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89 (February  1981),  pp. 26-53; Fumio 
Hayashi,  "The Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Estimation  and Testing  by Instrumental 
Variables,  " Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (October  1982),  pp. 895-916;  Robert  E. 
Hall, "Stochastic  Implications  of the Life-Cycle  Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Theory 
and  Evidence,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 86 (December  1978),  pp. 971-87. 290  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
lead one to overstate the effect of a fiscal program  on current  demand 
and saving. The second implication  is that consumption  depends on 
wealth,  and  wealth  includes  government  debt. Thus,  if and  when  deficits 
are closed, the effects on saving do not in fact disappear:  the higher 
level of debt, owing to the accumulation  of deficits, depresses saving 
until a lower level of capital is achieved. The appendix  formalizes  the 
above discussion  and  derives  an  index  of fiscal  stance;  the index  depends 
on both current  and anticipated  deficits as well as on the level of debt 
and characterizes  the effects of a fiscal program  on saving when con- 
sumers  are forward  looking. 
We are now in a position to characterize  the initial  effects on asset 
returns  and  prices of a sequence  of exogenous  increases  in deficits.  Such 
a shift  increases  interest  rates  for a long period  and  therefore  leads to an 
increase  in real rates at all maturities.  It also increases  required  returns 
on equity. The effect on stock prices is ambiguous;  although  required 
rates of return  on equities increase, the temporary  increase in output 
and  profits  may  temporarily  more  than  offset the  effects of higher  interest 
rates.7 Assuming that the economy returns relatively quickly to the 
equilibrium  level of output, there is a strong  presumption  that deficits 
reduce stock prices. 
Until now, we have not mentioned  exchange rates, thus implicitly 
assuming  that fiscal  policy is the same across countries.  What  happens, 
however, if one country  has a more expansionary  fiscal policy than the 
others? There is  a  strong presumption that its  exchange rate will 
appreciate, as predicted  by the simple Mundell-Fleming  model.8  Two 
factors work  in favor of appreciation:  the first  is the increase  in demand 
and thus the likely shift in relative  demand  toward  domestic goods; the 
second is the increase in interest rates. Over time, the sustained  trade 
deficits that arise from this appreciation  generate forces tending to 
7.  See OlivierJ.  Blanchard,  "Output,  the  Stock  Market,  and  InterestRates,"American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 71 (March  1981),  pp. 132-43. 
8. See Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Stanley  Fischer, "The Open  Economy:  Implications 
for Monetary  and Fiscal Policy," Working  Paper 1422  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  August 1984),  and Jeffrey  Sachs and  Charles  Wyplosz, "Real Exchange  Rate 
Effects of Fiscal Policy," Working  Paper  1255  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
January  1984),  for a detailed  discussion.  A. Giovannini,  "The  Exchange  Rate, the Capital 
Stock and Fiscal Policy" (Columbia  University,  June 1984),  and Willem  Buiter, "Fiscal 
Policy in Open, Interdependent  Economies"  (London  School  of Economics,  May 1984), 
develop  models  consistent  with  that  presented  in the appendix. Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  291 
depreciation.  Such trade deficits lead both to a transfer  of wealth to 
foreign  countries  over time and to an increase in the share  of domestic 
assets in both  domestic  and  foreign  portfolios.  The first  implies  a gradual 
shift in relative demand  away from domestic goods over time and thus 
depreciation.  The second is likely to require  both high  domestic  interest 
rates  and, eventually,  depreciation.  Anticipations  of the eventual  depre- 
ciation  may bring  the actual  depreciation  forward  in time. 
This  discussion  has  focused entirely  on the effects of fiscal  policy with 
the stock of money held constant  in the short  run  and full employment 
assumed  in the long run. It thus has considered  only the "pure" effects 
of fiscal  policy. It is important  to recognize  that the choice made  by the 
fiscal authority may influence the course of monetary policy.  For 
example,  if the monetary  authority  is concerned  with  the level of output, 
fiscal expansions  will induce monetary  contractions.  Alternatively,  if it 
is concerned  with the level of interest  rates or the exchange  rate, fiscal 
expansion  will lead to monetary  expansion.  In either  event, fiscal  policy 
will  have indirect  effects on interest  rates  through  its effects on monetary 
policy. We will return  below to these possible indirect  effects. 
SHIFTS  IN  THE  DEMAND  FOR  FUNDS 
The second explanation  we consider for high real interest rates is 
increased profitability.  This does not include the normal  cyclical im- 
provement  in profitability  that  takes place in a recovery  but instead  any 
increase in current  and prospective  profitability  beyond the part  attrib- 
utable to cyclical movements in output. Recent discussions have sug- 
gested various  reasons  for such an increase  in profitability.  These range 
from vague notions of a new industrial  revolution or of decreased 
uncertainty  about  the future  to the effects of the slowdown  in real  wage 
growth in Europe or the decrease in business taxation in the United 
States. Because the effects of a decrease in business taxation are the 
easiest to characterize,  we shall focus on them and briefly  extend the 
analysis  to the case of lower real  wage growth. 
In the short run, an increase in profitability  has an effect on output 
and  short-term  rates similar  to that  of fiscal  deficits:  as long as monetary 
policy does not fully accommodate it, higher profitability  increases 
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higher  short rates. To determine  what happens  to long-term  rates, we 
must  again  first  examine  the medium  and  long run. 
In the medium  run, output  is determined  by supply  and, if capital  has 
not increased  enough, the increase in investment  must  take place at the 
expense of the other components of spending. There is therefore  the 
presumption that real rates increase further as full employment is 
reached. However, real rates cannot rise more than after-tax  marginal 
products;  if they did, investment  would  be depressed  and, if investment 
were low, equilibrium  real  rates needed  to clear  the goods market  would 
be low, not high. 
In the long run, higher  investment  leads to a higher  equilibrium  level 
of capital. This higher  level of capital is associated with lower pretax 
marginal  products. How much greater  the capital  stock and how much 
higher  interest rates will be in the long run depends on the elasticity of 
the supply of capital  to the business sector with respect to the return  it 
yields. This in turn  depends  on the elasticity of saving  and  the extent to 
which capital  is reallocated  between business and nonbusiness  uses. If 
the supply  is inelastic, there  will be little change  in the capital  stock, and 
interest rates will increase by nearly the amount of the decrease in 
taxation.  If the supply  is elastic, however, the adjustment  will  fall mainly 
on the capital stock, leading to more capital, lower pretax marginal 
products,  and little change  in interest  rates. 
Because business capital  accounts  for only about  one-third  of wealth, 
it is reasonable  to expect substantial  reallocations  of capital  in the face 
of profitability  shocks. In addition,  Summers  has shown that under  the 
life-cycle hypothesis there is a strong  presumption  that the elasticity of 
saving will be positive and large. Econometric  evidence has not, how- 
ever, been successful at uncovering  such a large elasticity.9  Thus, it is 
difficult  to assess the effect of increased  profitability  on interest  rates in 
the long run.  10 
9. For a presentation  of the theoretical  argument  and a discussion of econometric 
evidence, see Lawrence H. Summers, "Capital  Taxation  and Accumulation  in a Life 
Cycle Growth  Model,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 71 (September  1981),  pp. 533- 
44. The available  evidence on the elasticity  of the supply  of funds  to the corporate  sector 
is discussed  in Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Taxation  and  Corporate  Investment:  A q- Theory 
Approach,  " BPEA,  1:1981,  pp. 67-127. Empirical  work  on the  interest  elasticity  of saving 
is presented  in Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Taxation,  Savings, and the Rate of Return," 
Working  Paper  995  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  September  1982). 
10. The description  of the dynamic  effects of business taxation  given in the text is 
based on various  formal models. Partial  equilibrium  models of the dynamic  effects of Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  293 
It has been argued  that currently  Europe  is suffering  classical unem- 
ployment,  a situation  in which output  is constrained  by too high  a level 
of real wages rather than too low a level of demand. How are the 
dynamics  described above modified  if the reason for increased profit- 
ability  is not a reduction  of business  taxation  but  a current  or  prospective 
slowdown in real wage growth?  The short-run  dynamics  may be quite 
different.  Investment  increases  while the effect of income  redistribution 
may decrease consumption.  Employment  and output supply are likely 
to increase. Whether  the supply  of output  increases more than  demand 
is ambiguous  and so is the movement  of short  rates. These effects have 
been emphasized  by Barro  and  Grossman.  "I  In the medium  and  long  run, 
which are of more interest  to us here, the main  difference  with business 
taxation  is that, because of lower real wages, employment  and output 
are now higher  at any level of capital.  This  implies  that  in addition  to the 
increase  in the demand  for funds, there  is a partly  offsetting  increase  in 
the supply of funds. Real rates may therefore  be lower in the medium 
and  long run  than  in the case of reduced  business taxation. 
We can now characterize  the initial  effects of a profitability  increase 
on asset returns  and prices. Real interest  rates increase  at all maturities 
and  so do  required  rates  of return  on  equities.  The  stock  market,  however, 
goes up: because it is investment demand that drives up real rates, 
expected  profitability  must  have increased  by more  than  interest  rates.12 
Can we predict  what happens  to the exchange rate if one country  is 
changes  in business  taxation  are  given  in Andrew  B. Abel, "Dynamic  Effects  of Permanent 
and  Temporary  Tax  Policies  in  a Q  Model  of Investment,  "  Journal  ofMonetary  Economics, 
vol. 9 (May 1982),  pp. 353-73, and in Summers,  "Taxation  and  Corporate  Investment." 
The general  equilibrium.  effects of changes in business taxes are analyzed  in Olivier  J. 
Blanchard  and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Anticipations,  Recession and Policy," Annales de 
l'INSEE  vol. 47-48 (July-December  1982),  pp. 117-44, using  an  intertemporal  disequilib- 
rium  model  with rational  expectations,  and  in Andrew  B. Abel and  Olivier  J. Blanchard, 
"An  Intertemporal  Model  of Saving  and  Investment,"  Econometrica,  vol. 51 (May  1983), 
pp. 675-92. See also C. Chamley,  "Efficient  Tax Reform  in a Dynamic  Model  of General 
Equilibrium,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  forthcoming,  and K. Judd, "Short  Run 
Analysis of Fiscal Policy in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model," Journal of Political 
Economy,  forthcoming. 
11. Robert  J. Barro  and Hershel  I. Grossman,  "A General  Disequilibrium  Model  of 
Income and Employment," American Economic Review, vol. 62 (March 1971), pp. 
82-93. 
12. This  ignores  the difference  between  marginal  and  average  q. See Fumio  Hayashi, 
"Tobin's  Marginal  q and  Average  q: A Neoclassical  Interpretation,"  Econometrica,  vol. 
50 (January  1982), pp. 213-24. This difference could be important  if the increase in 
profitability  affects existing capital differently  from new capital, as in the case of an 
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affected more strongly  than the others by the increase in profitability? 
We do not know of a formal  model that answers the question, but the 
answer  is likely to be that  the effect is ambiguous.  3 Higher  interest  rates 
and, if investment is mostly in the form of domestic goods, a relative 
shift in demand toward domestic goods both suggest appreciation. 
However, the anticipated  increase  in the relative  supply  of the domestic 
good after  capital  has accumulated  suggests  depreciation. 
TIGHT  MONEY 
The third  explanation  also attributes  high  long real rates to expected 
high short rates. It does not, however, attribute  high short rates to 
current or anticipated shifts in the full employment supply of,  and 
demand  for, funds but instead  to tight  money, which maintains  interest 
rates at values higher  than  their  equilibrium  level. 
There  is no question  that  tight  money can explain  high short  nominal 
and  real  rates. It is also generally  accepted  that  money in the long run  is 
neutral;  thus tight money, either as a lower level or as a lower rate of 
growth of money, leads to lower prices and has no long-run  effect on 
real rates. The relevant  question  is, How long is this long run? 
As a logical matter,  money has an effect on output  as long as it has an 
effect on real rates. Thus we can look at the econometric  evidence on 
the relation  of output to changes in money supply. Macroeconometric 
models  suggest  that  changes  in money  affect  real  output  for a long  period 
of time: the effects of an open market operation are sometimes still 
increasing  after four years.14  More recent reduced-form  evidence sug- 
gests shorter  lags. Estimates  by Barro,  under  the maintained  hypothesis 
that only unanticipated  money can affect output, still find  that  unantici- 
pated money affects output for four years. Mishkin, using the same 
13. Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, "Wages, Profits and Commodity  Prices" 
(Harvard  University Press, forthcoming),  looks at the closely related question of the 
effects of an increase  in the price  of oil. 
14. See, for example, Gordon Fisher and David Sheppard,  "Effects of Monetary 
Policy on the US Economy: A Survey of Econometric  Evidence," OECD  Economic 
Outlook,  Occasional  Studies  (December  1972),  for a review  of models.  In the current  DRI 
model, an increase  in nonborrowed  reserves  has a multiplier  effect on real  GNP of 1.9 in 
the current  quarter,  a peak  effect of 2.5 in the eighth  quarter;  the effect  decreases  to 2 after 
twenty-four  quarters  (DRI, "Properties  of 1983  version  of the DRI  Model,"  Review  of the 
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methodology  but allowing both anticipated  and unanticipated  money 
effects, finds effects of unanticipated  money for four years and effects 
of anticipated  money for three years, although  the latter  become small 
and  insignificant  after  two years.  15 
Other  evidence  is provided  by the relation  of interest  rates  to inflation. 
We have documented  elsewhere the failure  of nominal  interest  rates to 
adjust  fully to changes  in long-term  expectations  of inflation.  16  This may 
be interpreted  as evidence that  money affects real  rates  for some period 
of time. 
Additional  evidence that monetary  policy can affect long-term  real 
rates comes from studies of the response of rates to money announce- 
ments. It is now well documented that unexpected increases in the 
money supply are associated with increases in interest rates at all 
maturities,  which could be due to increases in expected inflation  or in 
real rates. However, Engel and Frankel  have shown that unexpected 
money  is also associated  with  exchange  rate  appreciation.  17  This  suggests 
that  increases  in rates  reflect  increases  in real  rates. If expected  inflation 
rose, one would expect exchange  rate  depreciation  rather  than  appreci- 
ation. 
Thus, when tight money is responsible  for high  real rates, we expect 
the term structure  of real rates to be downward  sloping  for maturities 
longer  than  a few years. If tight  money means  lower money growth,  the 
same should also be true of nominal  rates, because both real rates and 
expected inflation are expected to be lower eventually. There is no 
ambiguity  about what happens to stock prices. Required  returns on 
equities  increase  with  real  bond  rates  and  prospective  dividends  decrease 
together  with output;  stock prices  must  therefore  decrease.  There  is also 
no ambiguity  about  the exchange  rate  if one country  has  tighter  monetary 
policy than  the others. Higher  interest  rates  lead to initial  real apprecia- 
tion, which slowly disappears  as rates  return  to their  normal  level. 
15. Robert  J. Barro,  "Unanticipated  Money,  Output,  and  the  Price  Level  in the United 
States," Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 86 (August 1978),  pp. 549-80; Frederic  S. 
Mishkin,  A Rational  Expectations  Approach  to Macroeconomics:  Testing  Policy  Ineffec- 
tiveness  and  Efficient-Markets  Models  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1983),  table  6-5. 
16. See Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The Non-adjustment  of Nominal  Interest  Rates:  A 
Study  of the Fisher Effect," in James  Tobin, ed., Macro-economics,  Prices, and Quan- 
tities:  Essays in Memory  of Arthur  M. Okun  (Brookings,  1983),  pp. 201-44. 
17. Charles  Engel and Jeffrey Frankel, "Why Interest  Rates React to Money An- 
nouncements:  An Explanation  from  the Foreign  Exchange  Market,"  Journal  of Monetary 
Economics,  vol. 13  (January  1984),  pp. 31-39. 296  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
PORTFOLIO  SHIFTS 
The first  three explanations  attribute  high  long rates to anticipations 
of high short rates. They implicitly assume that the risk premiums 
associated with long bonds or equities remain constant. The fourth 
explanation  questions  the assumption  of constant  risk  premiums. 
The  premium  required  to hold  any  asset increases  if the  risk  associated 
with holding  the asset increases. Finance theory suggests that the risk 
should  be measured  by the covariance  of the asset return  with  the return 
on the market  portfolio  or more  generally  by the covariance  of the asset 
return  with movements  in consumption.  Assets with low returns  in bad 
times have risk that cannot be diversified  away and are therefore  more 
risky. This covariance depends in turn on both the variances and 
covariances of all assets and on their relative supplies. Thus there are 
many developments  that plausibly  may have led to an increase in risk 
premiums  on bonds, ranging  from a relative  increase in the proportion 
of public debt in portfolios to changes in the expected variability  of 
inflation  or in the feedback  rules of monetary  authorities. 
If the increase  in long real  rates  reflects  an increase  in risk  premiums, 
it is difficult  to predict  what happens  to stock returns  and stock prices. 
This obviously depends on what causes the increase in risk premiums 
on bonds. An increase in the relative supply  of bonds or an increase in 
the variance of inflation  may have little or no effect on required  stock 
returns.  The same ambiguity  extends to the real exchange rate. If, for 
example, the risk associated with holding  domestic  bonds increases  for 
both domestic and  foreign  residents,  there  is no reason  for the exchange 
rate  to appreciate  as domestic interest  rates increase. 
We have now surveyed four potential explanations for high real 
interest  rates. Their  differing  implications  for the level and slope of the 
term structure  of real rates, for stock prices, and  for exchange  rates are 
summarized  in table 9. The information  in the table restricts  the set of 
possible explanations  for high rates. Neither tight money nor deficits 
can be the whole story, because the stock market  has been relatively 
strong.  Taken  alone, the information  in  table  9 points  toward  profitability 
as a principal  cause of high real rates. Before the importance  of any of 
the four causes can be  judged, however, it is necessary  to examine  them 
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Table 9.  Bonds, Stocks, and Real Exchange Rates under Alternative Hypotheses 
Real rates on bonds  Stock markets  Real 
Hypothesis  Medium  term  Long term  Rates of return  Prices  exchange rates 
Adverse  shifts  Strong  Strong  Strong  Ambiguous  Increase 
in saving  increase  increase  increase  or decrease 
or increase 
Favorable  shifts  Strong  Strong  Strong  Strong  Increase 
in profitability  increase  increase  increase  increase  or ambiguous 
or increase 
Tight  money  Strong  Increase  Increase  Decrease  Strong  increase 
increase 
Portfolio  shifts  Strong  Strong  Ambiguous  Ambiguous  Ambiguous 
increase  increase 
Addendum 
Actual  move-  Strong  Increase  Ambiguous  Increase  Strong  increase 
ments  increase 
a. Alternative  in  entries  indicates  more  than  one  response  is predicted  by  theory. 
Adverse Shifts in Saving: Fiscal Policy 
Under the hypothesis that high real interest rates in our group of 
OECD countries reflect current and anticipated  public dissaving, we 
must  not focus on any single  country's  deficit  but instead  on the group's 
aggregate  fiscal deficit or, more generally,  on an aggregate  measure  of 
the group's fiscal stances. Under perfect capital mobility and barring 
distribution  effects, equilibrium  real  rates  in  each  country  are  determined 
by the aggregate  deficit  regardless  of its own deficit.'8  Under  imperfect 
capital  mobility,  equilibrium  real  rates  in each country  will depend  partly 
on its own deficit  and  partly  on the aggregate  deficit,  but it remains  true 
that the average level of rates will be related to the aggregate  deficit. 
Thus, in this section a focus on aggregate  measures is appropriate. 
However, when we come to consider  a monetary  and fiscal policy mix 
as the cause of high  interest  rates, we shall  have to focus not only on the 
aggregate  measure  but on intercountry  differences  as well. 
CURRENT  AND  PAST  DEFICITS 
The top part  of table 10  gives the 1978-85 net budget  balances  for all 
levels of government,  which for the United States means  federal, state, 
18. Distribution  effects may arise if, for example, the countries  with larger  deficits 
have  consumers  with a higher  propensity  to save or have a lower proportion  of liquidity- 
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Table 10.  Budget Positions as a Percentage of GNP,  1978-85a 
United  West  United  Weighted 
Year  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan  sum 
Unadjusted 
1978  0.2  -1.9  -2.5  -4.2  -9.7  -5.5  -2.4 
1979  0.6  -0.7  -2.7  -3.2  -9.5  -4.8  -1.9 
1980  -1.2  0.2  -3.1  -3.5  -8.0  -4.5  -2.5 
1981  -0.9  -1.8  -3.8  -2.8  -11.9  -4.0  -2.4 
1982  -3.8  -2.6  -3.5  -2.1  -12.7  -3.4  -3.3 
1983  -3.9  -3.2  -2.7  -3.7  -11.8  -3.1  -3.8 
1984  -3.1  -3.5  -1.4  -2.8  -12.4  -2.3  -3.2 
1985  -3.7  - 3.5  -0.4  -2.4  -12.9  -1.6  - 3.2 
Adjustedfor  inflation 
1978  1.6  - 1.0  -2.3  -0.3  -2.5  -5.2  -0.8 
1979  2.4  0.3  -2.3  2.6  -0.4  -4.3  0.2 
1980  0.5  1.4  -2.4  3.6  4.2  -3.2  0.2 
1981  0.7  -0.6  -3.0  2.0  -1.2  -3.0  -0.5 
1982  -2.8  -1.3  -2.7  1.5  -2.4  -2.8  -2.3 
1983  - 3.1  -2.0  -2.2  -1.4  -1.6  -2.7  -2.6 
1984  -2.2  -2.3  -0.8  -0.7  -4.4  -1.6  -1.8 
1985  -2.5  -2.4  0.3  -0.1  -6.3  -0.8  -1.9 
Midcycle,  adjusted  for inflation 
1978  0.5  -2.1  -2.9  -2.1  -2.6  -5.1  -1.6 
1979  1.3  -  1.0  -3.3  0.6  -1.2  -4.4  -0.7 
1980  1.1  0.7  -3.2  4.0  3.4  -3.3  0.1 
1981  1.4  -0.3  -3.0  4.4  -1.4  -3.1  0.0 
1982  -0.4  -0.7  -1.6  4.5  -2.0  -2.7  -1.2 
1983  -1.2  -0.8  -0.4  1.5  0.0  -2.3  - 1.1 
1984  -  1.3  -0.2  0.8  1.7  -1.9  -1.2  -0.8 
1985  -2.3  0.1  1.5  2.1  -3.7  -0.5  - 1.1 
Source:  Data  for 1978-83,  OECD,  "Structural  Budget  Deficits  and Fiscal Stance,"  Working  Paper  15  (Paris,  July 
1, 1984);  for 1984-85,  OECD Economic  Outlook, no. 34 (July 1984). 
a. Budget  surpluses  and deficits  aggregated  over all levels of government  for each country.  Minus  sign indicates 
deficit.  For the weighted  sum, the weights  are:  GNPiei/XYj  GNPjej,  where  e is the exchange  rate. Contemporaneous 
exchange  rates are used for 1978-83,  and 1983  exchange  rates are used for 1984-85.  Values  for 1984-85  are mid- 
1984  OECD  estimates  and forecasts. 
and local, as a percent of GNP for the six OECD countries (1984-85 
numbers  are mid-1984  OECD estimates and forecasts). There is fiscal 
expansion  in the United States, France, and  Italy  and  contraction  in the 
United Kingdom,  West Germany,  and Japan.  As a result the aggregate 
deficit  as a percent  of the group's  GNP (constructed  using contempora- 
neous exchange rates) shows an increase  of only 0.8 percentage  points 
over the period, compared with 3.9 percentage  points in the United 
States. 
However,  it is now  well  understood  that  official  deficits  do  not  measure 
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deficits  must  be adjusted  for inflation  by subtracting  from  the deficit  the 
part  of net nominal  interest  payments  that  is due to inflation.  '9 Inflation- 
corrected net budget positions as a percent of GNP are given in the 
middle  part of table 10. The deficits are smaller  than in the top part of 
table 10, with small aggregate surpluses in 1979 and 1980. Declining 
inflation  but increasing  debt levels imply that the path of the aggregate 
deficit  is quite similar  to that of the top part  of table 10. The increase  in 
the aggregate  inflation-adjusted  deficit  is equal to 1.1 percentage  points 
of GNP, compared  with  4.1 percentage  points  for the United  States. The 
conclusion  that  the inflation-adjusted  aggregate  deficit  has not increased 
much during  the period does not depend on our choice of 1978 as a 
starting  year. The average inflation-adjusted  deficit for 1970-78 is 0.2 
percent  of GNP. 
Anticipated  short real rates depend not on current  and past deficits 
but  rather  on future  anticipated  deficits.  A first, simple,  and  crude  proxy 
for future deficits is the current cyclically adjusted deficit. Thus we 
present  midcycle inflation-adjusted  budget  positions in the bottom  part 
of table 10. They measure  what the net budget  position would be if the 
economies were at their normal  midcycle level. The bottom  part  of the 
table  shows very clearly  that  the United States  is a mirror  image  of other 
countries  taken together:  the U.S. deficits increased  by 2.8 percentage 
points and the others decreased  by 3.3 percentage  points. Although  we 
have focused on only six countries, the conclusion would be the same 
for the OECD as a whole; although  some small countries (Denmark, 
Ireland)  have experienced  large  increases  in their  adjusted  deficit, their 
weight  is too small  to matter  in the aggregate.20 
ANTICIPATIONS  OF  FUTURE  DEFICITS 
Cyclically adjusted  deficits are still only rough  proxies for anticipa- 
tions of future  deficits. Such anticipations  should  be more than  projec- 
19. The official  deficit  might  be more  appropriate  as a measure  of the effect of policy 
on demand  if consumers  suffer  from  inflation  illusion  and  treat  nominal  interest  payments 
as real  interest  payments.  For a discussion  and  tests using  Italian  data,  see F. Modigliani, 
T. Jappelli,  and  M. Pagano,  "The  Impact  of Fiscal  Policy  and  Inflation  on National  Saving: 
The Italian  Case" (Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology,  May 1984).  For a discussion 
of inflation  adjustments,  see Robert  Eisner  and  Paul  J. Pieper,  "A New View  of the  Federal 
Debt  and  Budget  Deficits,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 74 (March  1984),  pp. 11-29. 
20. Numbers  for  all  OECD  countries  for  the  longer  period  1971-83  are  given  in  OECD, 
"Structural  Budget  Deficits  and  Fiscal Stance," Working  Paper  15  (OECD,  July 1984). 300  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
tions of current  policies; they should incorporate  forecasts of employ- 
ment growth  and future  fiscal policies; they should  also consider  that a 
rise in debt  and  associated  interest  payments  over time  will  lead  to larger 
deficits when full or normal employment is reached. Unfortunately, 
consistent  forecasts  that  take  these factors  into account  beyond 1985  are 
not  available  for  most  countries.  They  are  available  for  the United  States, 
however, from DRI, whose deficit forecasts incorporate  anticipated 
deficit  "downpayments"  and  other  changes  in  policy. The  DRI  forecasts 
are to be distinguished  from, and for our purposes preferred  to, the 
widely used and cited projections  of the Congressional  Budget Office; 
as the CBO itself emphasizes, their projections assume that policy 
remains  unchanged.  The results of the different  concepts represented 
by DRI and the CBO are illustrated  in table 11, which compares  their 
last four annual  six-year  anticipations  of unified  federal  budget  deficits. 
For 1980  and 1981,  CBO  projections  showed substantial  federal  budget 
surpluses  five years out owing  to the fiscal  drift  built  into the tax system; 
DRI more realistically  predicted  modest deficits. Likewise, in 1984  the 
DRI forecast again included policy shifts and showed a 1989 federal 
budget  deficit  of 3.4 percent of GNP, whereas the CBO obtained  a 1989 
deficit of 6.1 percent. We use the DRI forecasts as more useful in our 
context than the CBO projections, though it must be emphasized  that 
DRI assumes there  will be changes  from  current  policy. As shown  in the 
last column of table 11, the DRI calendar-year  forecast of combined 
federal, state, and local government  budget positions shows deficits 
peaking  at 3.4 percent of GNP in 1985  and declining  to 1.8 percent of 
GNP  in 1989.  Because inflation  is predicted  to be approximately  constant 
during  the period  and  employment  is predicted  to be nearly  full by 1985, 
neither  inflation  adjustment  nor cyclical adjustment  alters the forecast 
of a decreasing  trend. 
We do not have such long-term  forecasts for the other countries. 
Announced  medium-term  strategies  show no anticipated  change  in their 
fiscal stance. Given current  forecasts of approximately  constant  unem- 
ployment, this suggests little change in cyclically adjusted  deficits for 
Europe or Japan. Lower U.S. deficits and unchanged  deficits in other 
countries suggest a slow decrease in the aggregate  cyclically adjusted 
deficit after 1985. It seems that high real rates cannot be attributed  to 
prospective  aggregate  deficits. 
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Table  11. U.S. Budget  Positions  as a Percentage  of GNP:  Annual  CBO  Projections 
and DRI  Forecasts,  1980-89a 
1984 
DRI, 
Unified  federal budget  position  total 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  gov-  Fiscal  ern- 
year  CBO  DRI  CBO  DRI  CBO  DRI  CBO  DRI  CBO  DRI  mentb 
1980  -1.6  -1.6  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1981  -0.8  -2.0  -1.7  -2.5  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1982  1.0  -0.7  -0.9  -1.8  -3.6  -3.9  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1983  2.8  -0.5  0.5  -1.5  -4.6  -3.8  -6.0  -6.4  ...  ...  ... 
1984  4.7  -0.3  1.9  -1.6  -5.0  -3.4  -5.6  -5.8  -5.3  -5.1  -3.1 
1985  6.6  -0.3  3.1  -  1.0  -5.0  -2.5  -5.6  -5.2  -5.0  -5.0  -3.4 
1986  ...  4.3  -0.7  -5.1  -2.3  -5.6  -4.7  -5.1  -4.5  -3.0 
1987  ...  ...  ...  ...  -5.0  -2.1  -5.6  -4.0  -5.4  -4.4  -2.8 
1988  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -5.6  -3.2  -5.6  -3.8  -2.1 
1989  ...  ...  ...  .  .  .  .-6.1  -3.4  -1.8 
Source:  Congressional  Budget  Office,  Baseline  Budget  Projections  for Fiscal Years  1985-1989,  A Report  to the 
Senate  and  House Committees  on the Budget,  Part  II (Government  Printing  Office, 1984),  p. 7, and  previous  issues; 
DRI,  Long-term  Review  of the U.S. Economy  (DRI, March  1984),  and previous  issues. 
a. Minus  sign indicates  deficit. 
b. Sum  of DRI  forecasts  of federal,  state, and  local government  budget  positions  in the national  income  accounts, 
divided  by DRI forecasts  of GNP (calendar  years). 
consumers  are forward  looking, the effect of fiscal policy on demand  in 
a given year is not well measured  by current  deficits.  The effect of fiscal 
policy in 1984  on aggregate  demand  in 1984, for example, depends on 
both current  and  anticipated  deficits  and  also on the level of debt. In the 
first  part of the appendix  we have derived a theoretical  index of fiscal 
stance  along  these lines. In the second  part  of the appendix  we construct 
empirical  counterparts  to this index  for all six countries  for 1978  to 1989; 
1978  to 1984  values are  estimates, 1985  to 1989  values are  forecasts. For 
each year, the index depends on the current level of debt and the 
forecasts of primary  deficits over the following ten years. The results 
confirm  the conclusions reached  above. The U.S. index increases  from 
1978  to 1983,  declines slightly  in 1984,  and  is then  anticipated  to decrease 
slowly over time. In Europe, the indexes for West Germany  and the 
United  Kingdom  show steady past, current,  and anticipated  decreases. 
France  and Italy show increases over time; in both cases this is due to 
steady  increases in their  debt to GNP ratios. The index  for Japan  shows 
a steady decrease. The aggregate  index shows little change over the 
period, except for a temporary  increase in 1983;  it is anticipated  to be 
lower  in 1989  than  in 1978. 302  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
On balance, therefore, we find no evidence that fiscal policy in the 
OECD as a whole is responsible, through  its effect on saving, for high 
long real rates. This does not rule out, however, that a fiscal-monetary 
mix may be partly  responsible  for these rates, and we shall turn  to this 
issue below. 
Fiscal policy is not the only factor that may shift saving. Another 
potential candidate is a shift in saving behavior of the oil exporting 
countries. The combined  current  account of OPEC  countries  has gone 
from approximate  balance in 1978  to a surplus  of $111 billion in 1980, 
and then back to deficits  in 1982;  deficits  of $12 billion  are predicted  for 
1985.21 Taking  the current  account of OPEC countries  as a percent of 
the GNP of the group of countries we consider, the change in current 
account  balance  corresponds  to a swing  from  a surplus  of 0.1 percent  in 
1978  to a surplus  of 1.8  percent  in 1980  and  back  to a deficit  of 0.2 percent 
in 1985.  Although  the swing from 1980  to 1985  is a large  one, no one in 
1980  thought  that the OPEC surplus  would remain  at such a high  level. 
The decrease from 1980  was at least partly anticipated  and cannot be 
blamed  for the increase  in real  rates after 1980. 
Favorable Shifts in Profitability 
The conceptual discussion has shown that an explanation  based on 
favorable shifts in profitability  has considerable  appeal. Such shifts, if 
they occurred, can explain  both high real interest  rates, because of the 
increased demand  for funds, and the strong stock market,  because of 
higher  prospective  profits.  A number  of plausible  causes for such shifts 
have been proposed. Some are specific to some countries, suggesting 
different  stock market  and investment  performances  across countries; 
some apply  to all countries. 
One candidate  for causing  a shift  to greater  profitability  is the general 
decrease  in business taxation  in the United  States since 1981.22  The  pace 
at which the investments could be depreciated  was dramatically  in- 
21. OECD  Economic  Outlook,  no. 34 (July  1984),  table  54. 
22. The argument  that high real rates were due to the 1981  tax changes and were 
therefore  likely  to remain  was made  as early  as 1982  by Stanley  Fischer  and  Steven  Sheffrin 
in "Why Long Term Real Interest Rates Will Stay High" (Massachusetts  Institute  of 
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creased in 1981.  In addition,  reduced  inflation  has raised  the real value 
of historical  depreciation  allowances.  The  effect  on  the  world  real  interest 
rate, however, is likely to be small: Auerbach  has estimated that the 
effective tax rate  on corporate  investment  declined  from  31.9 percent  in 
1980  to 17.7  percent in 1981  and 24.6 percent  in 1982.23  This represents 
an increase of  73 basis points in the after-tax return to corporate 
investment  between 1980  and 1982,  assuming  a constant  pretax  marginal 
product  of capital  of 10  percent.  This increase  should  not translate  point 
for point into higher interest rates. At market value, U.S.  corporate 
capital  represents  only one-fifth  of U. S. wealth  and  a much  smaller  share 
of world wealth. Feldstein and Summers  have estimated that each 1 
percentage point increase in the after-tax  return  to corporate capital 
raises real interest  rates  by 25 basis points.24  This number  was obtained 
by estimation  over the period 1954-76;  the greater  integration  of capital 
markets  since then suggests an even smaller  effect on real rates now. 
Overall,  the effect of U.S. business  tax cuts on the world  real  rate  cannot 
be very large. 
Another class of candidates  includes decreases in factor prices and 
increases  in productivity.  Two recent studies  have examined  the recent 
behavior  of productivity  and  have found  no evidence that, after  cyclical 
adjustment,  productivity  growth has recently increased in the United 
States.25  Some factor prices, however, have declined. For the group  of 
European countries we consider, real unit labor costs declined 0.6 
percent  in 1982  and 1.2 percent  in 1983.  They are projected  to decline a 
further  0.9 percent  in 1984.26  The price of oil has also declined.  The real 
spot market  price of oil to U.S. users has decreased  25 percent  from  its 
1981-84:1  high. However, as a consequence  of real  dollar  appreciation, 
there has been little or no change in the real price of oil for the other 
countries  we are  looking  at. These decreases  in  factor  prices  should  have 
improved  current  profitability  and may also have led to anticipations  of 
23. See table 4 in Alan J. Auerbach, "Corporate  Taxation  in the United States," 
BPEA, 2:1983, pp. 451-505. 
24. Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers,  "Inflation,  Tax Rules, and the Long- 
Term  Interest  Rate," BPEA,  1:1978,  pp. 61-99. 
25. Peter  K. Clark,  "Productivity  and  Profits  in the 1980s:  Are They Really  Improv- 
ing?"  BPEA, 1:1984,  pp. 133-67, and Robert  J. Gordon,  "Unemployment  and  Potential 
Output  in the 1980s,"  BPEA,  this issue. 
26. European  Economy, Annual Economic Report no. 18 (European  Community, 
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higher  future  profitability.  Assessing their potential  quantitative  effect 
is not something  we shall  attempt. 
The last class of candidates  includes decreases in uncertainty  owing 
to the decrease in inflation  or to the emergence  of conservative  govern- 
ments in the United States, the United Kingdom,  and West Germany. 
These may well have an effect; they are, however, difficult  to quantify. 
A test of the hypothesis that business prospects are bright  involves 
the performance  of investment. Investment spending  has been unex- 
pectedly strong in 1983 and 1984 in most countries.27  The question 
therefore  arises of whether  this is due to unexpected  strength  in output 
or instead to other shifts in anticipated  profitability.  In order  to resolve 
this issue, we run  for each country, over the 1962:3-1982:4  period, the 
following  regression: 
6 
(6)  lnI, = ao +  >  biln Yt-i + ut, 
i=O 
where 
Ut  =  PlUt-I  +  P2Ut-2  +  Et. 
The variable  I, is real gross private fixed investment and Y,  is real 
GNP. This  regression  should  not be thought  of as a structural  investment 
equation  but as an equation  characterizing  the movement  of investment 
given output. We then construct forecasts for 1983:1  to 1984:1  using 
dynamic simulations, that is, simulations  using actual values of GNP 
and lagged forecast errors  for u,_- and u_2. Under the hypothesis that 
there has been no  shift in profitability, high real rates imply that 
investment spending  should be low given the level of output. Thus we 
would  expect negative  forecast  errors  during  that  period.  These forecast 
errors  are reported  in table 12 together  with the standard  errors  of the 
regressions. Forecast errors  are positive and often individually  signifi- 
cant for the United States, West Germany,  and Italy. Forecast errors 
alternate in sign in France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. In no 
country  is there  a consistent  pattern  of negative  forecast  errors. 
These results  suggest  an  underlying  shift  in profitability  or investment 
uncertainty;  otherwise it is difficult  to reconcile high real rates and the 
behavior  of investment. This conclusion holds with particular  strength 
27. See, for example, "Business Survey  Results," European  Economy,  Supplement 
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Table  12. Errors  in Dynamic  Forecasts  of Investment,  1983:1-84:1a 
Percent 
United  West  United 
Period  States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
1983:1  1.9  2.3  -0.4  1.8  2.0  0.4 
2  1.7  -0.6  1.1  -  1.1  4.4  0.9 
3  3.4  -0.3  4.8  -0.1  5.6  -0.1 
4  7.8  1.2  5.4  2.9  4.8  1.1 
1984:1  7.8  1.4  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Addendum: 
Standard  deviation 
for the forecast 
error  1.6  1.3  2.8  3.1  1.6  1.6 
Source:  Calculations  based  on OECD  data. 
a. The forecast  error,  e,,  is constructed  as follows: 
6 
e,  In  It  -  a* -  E; b* In Y-  pf u,l-1  P2*4-2, 
i=o 
u=  plu7-I  +  p2ut-2  +  Et, 
where  I denotes real investment,  and Y  denotes real output.  Asterisks  denote  estimated  value. Real investment  is 
seasonally  adjusted  and defined  for each country  as follows: United States, real fixed nonresidential  investment; 
West  Germany,  real  gross domestic  fixed investment;  Italy, United Kingdom,  and France,  real  gross fixed capital 
formation;  Japan,  real  gross private  fixed  investment.  Output  for all countries  is real  gross national  product. 
for the more recent part of the period. The estimated  residuals  for the 
earlier  period, 1980-82, show no consistent  pattern,  nor do the forecast 
errors  for  that  period  if we estimate  investment  equations  over the  period 
1963-80  and  generate  dynamic  forecasts  for 1980-84. 
Tight Money 
The explanations  we have considered so far have focused on real 
rather  than  monetary  factors. We now turn  to the role of tight  money in 
explaining  high  long  real  rates. It seems very clear  that  tight  money  plays 
a major  role in explaining  the increase  in real  rates  through  1982.  Direct, 
nonquantitative  evidence on changes  in monetary  policy for the United 
States and the United Kingdom  is plentiful.  Although  rates of changes 
of monetary  aggregates  across countries  do not consistently decrease, 
shifts  in relative  demands  for M  I and  M2  can  easily explain  the divergent 
movements  between the different  aggregates.  If one makes  the hypoth- 
esis that  monetary  policy determines  short-term  nominal  rates, then the 
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prima  facie evidence of tight money. The only question  is whether  the 
increase in long real rates up to 1982  can be attributed  entirely  to tight 
monetary  policy. The studies of the relation between short and long 
nominal  rates during  the period  are relevant  here. Several studies have 
shown  that  the pre-1979  dynamic  relation  between short  and  long nomi- 
nal rates did break down after 1979.28  Given short nominal  rates, long 
nominal  rates  increased  in 1980  and 1981  far  more  than  would  have been 
predicted  by term-structure  equations. This does not imply that tight 
money was not fully responsible  for the increase in long rates. If the 
change in monetary  policy was indeed perceived  as a change  in regime 
by financial  markets,  we would  expect the  normal  term-structure  relation 
to underpredict  the reaction of long nominal  rates to such a change in 
policy.29 
The more difficult  question is whether tight money is largely or at 
least partly  responsible  for high  real  rates since 1982.  Two explanations 
of long real rates place responsibility  on the fiscal-monetary  mix. The 
first explanation can be described as loose U.S.  fiscal policy, tight 
European  monetary  policy. We saw earlier  that there has been little or 
no change  in aggregate  fiscal  policy; this explanation  focuses instead  on 
the divergence  between U.S. and  other  fiscal  policies. In the absence of 
tight  monetary  policy, these divergent  movements  in fiscal  policy would 
have had offsetting effects on the world long real rate but cumulating 
effects on the real  exchange  rate:  fiscal  contraction  outside  of the United 
States and  fiscal  expansion  in the United  States are  both  likely to lead to 
real U.S. appreciation.  Thus, in order  to avoid  further  depreciation  and 
inflationary  pressure, Europe and Japan have used tight money to 
increase their long real rates. Under  this interpretation,  high U.S. long 
rates are due to expansionary  fiscal  policy while high  long rates outside 
the United States are due to tight  money. Also under  this interpretation, 
Europe'  s increasing  reluctance  to use tight  money  because  of its adverse 
output effects together with the decrease in inflationary  pressure that 
has occurred has led Europe in 1984 to accept lower long rates and 
further  depreciation. 
The second explanation  can be described  as loose U.S. fiscal  policy, 
28. See, for example, Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "The Lucas Critique  and the Volcker 
Deflation,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 74 (May 1984,  Papers and Proceedings, 
1983),  pp. 211-16, and  Richard  H. Clarida  and  Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Why  Have  Short- 
Term  Interest  Rates  Been So High?"  BPEA,  2:1983,  pp. 553-85. 
29. For  a formal  argument,  see Blanchard,  "The  Lucas  Critique." Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  307 
tight  anticipated  U.S. monetary  policy. Even if aggregate  fiscal  policy is 
constant, fiscal expansion in the United States implies an increase in 
U.S. aggregate  demand, while fiscal contraction  elsewhere implies a 
decrease  in aggregate  demand  outside of the United States. The United 
States is, however, well along  in its recovery, and a period  of sustained 
tight money may be needed as the economy approaches  full employ- 
ment. Given a desire on the part of Europe  and Japan  to avoid further 
depreciation  of their currencies,  money is also anticipated  to be tight  in 
the rest of the world, leading  to high  real  rates there  as well. This fiscal- 
monetary  mix can also explain  the continuing  strength  of the dollar. 
These two explanations  can be interpreted  as linking  high real rates 
ultimately  to U.S. budget  deficits.  But the channel  is very different  from 
that  explored  earlier.  It is the divergence  in fiscal policies together  with 
its implications  for the real exchange rate and with monetary  reaction 
functions  that  leads to high  real  rates. These explanations  are difficult  to 
prove or disprove; but there is little doubt that tight money is in some 
measure  responsible  for current  high  long real  rates. 
Portfolio Shifts 
We turn  now to the possibility  that  high  real  rates or, more  generally, 
recent movements in asset prices and returns  are partly  attributable  to 
changes in risk premiums.  We look more specifically  for evidence that 
risk  premiums  on bonds  have increased  or that  risk  premiums  on equities 
have decreased. 
We start  by constructing  a simple  measure  of risk  that  is both  intuitive 
and  suggested  by finance  theory.  This  measure  is the covariance  between 
the rate of change of consumption  and the ex post rate of return  on an 
asset: an asset with high returns  when consumption  is low provides a 
hedge and therefore requires a low expected return, a negative risk 
premium.30  In general, the more  procyclical  the asset return,  the higher 
the risk  premium. 
In  figure  2 we present  time series  for the estimated  rolling  covariances 
30. Maximization  of expected  utility  implies  that  the  appropriate  measure  of risk  is the 
covariance  between  the realized  marginal  rate  of substitution  and  the ex post rate  of return 
on the asset; the covariance  we consider  is a close approximation  to this covariance.  See, 
for example,  L. Hansen  and K. Singleton,  "Stochastic  Consumption,  Risk  Aversion  and 
the Temporal  Behavior  of Asset Returns,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 91 (April 
1983),  pp. 249-65. Figure 2.  Rolling Covariance of Real Holding Returns on Bonds with Consuhnption 
Changes, 1973-84a 
Source:  Bond  data,  OECD  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues.  Consumption  data,  OECD,  Quiarterly National 
Accounts,  various  issues.  Data for the  United  States  extend  to  1984:1; for the  United  Kingdom,  1983:3; for France 
and West Germany,  1983:4; for Italy,  1982:4; for Japan,  1982:1. 
a.  Rates  of  return and consumption  changes  are in percent  at annual rates.  Rates  of  return are deflated  by the 
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between  the rate  of change  of consumption  and  the real  rate  of return  on 
medium-term  bonds for all six countries. In each case, the real rate of 
return  is computed  using  the domestic  CPI.31  The covariance  at any time 
t is computed  using  observations  from  the last twelve quarters.  The  main 
characteristic  of figure  2 is the diversity  of movements  across countries. 
Apart  from a small increase in the United States after 1981,  there is no 
evidence of an increase  in the risk  of bonds measured  this way. 
Figure  3 performs  the same exercise for the covariance  between the 
rate of change of consumption  and the real rate of return  on stocks. 
Again,  no consistent  pattern  emerges.  The U. S. covariance  goes up  after 
1979  rather  than down as would be required  to explain the strength  of 
the stock market.  No common  trend  emerges  for other  countries. 
Examination  of these covariances therefore does not reveal either 
increases in risk for bonds or decreases in risk for stocks. There are, 
however, a few reasons to doubt that these covariances are accurate 
measures of  risk. One reason is  conceptual: the use  of  aggregate 
consumption  is correct only if all consumers have the same portfolio 
choices available  to them so that no consumer  is liquidity  constrained. 
The other  reasons are technical:  because of data  limitations,  our empir- 
ical measure of consumption  is consumption  expenditures  rather  than 
the more appropriate  consumption  services; also because of data limi- 
tations, we are forced to use time averages for consumption  and thus 
also for stock and bond returns,  whereas theory is about consumption 
at points in time. For these reasons, the estimated  covariances  may be 
noisy indicators  of risk. 
To go further,  we turn to the pricing  formulas  implied  by the more 
restrictive  standard  capital  asset pricing  model. This model  implies  that 
equilibrium  expected returns  on risky  assets are  given by 
(7)  (Rit  -  rt) =  a(E  (ris1t)t 
where  Rit  is the equilibrium  expected rate of return  on asset i for period 
t, and  rt  is the riskless rate. The coefficient  a is a weighted  average,  with 
positive weights, of the agents' coefficients of absolute risk aversion. 
31. We look therefore  at riskiness in each country from the point of view of the 
domestic  investor.  We could have computed  instead  the measure  of risk  relevant  for the 
U.S. investor  holding  domestic  or foreign  bonds  by using  for all cases U.S. consumption 
and  the real  rate  in terms  of the U.S. consumption  basket. Figure 3.  Rolling Covariance of Real Holding Returns on Stocks with Consumption 
Changes,  1973-84a 
Source:  Stock  data,  OECD Financial  Statistics,  various issues.  Consumption data,  same as figure 2. Data for the 
United States  extend  to  1984:1; for the United  Kingdom,  France,  and West Germany,  1983:4; for Italy,  1982:4; for 
Japan, 1982:1. 
a.  Units are as in figure 2. Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H. Summers  311 
The variable  Oij  is the covariance  of the rate  of return  on asset i with the 
rates of return on the other assetsj  =  1, .  .  .  ,  n. Last, Sjt is the value of 
the supply  of assetj at time t.32 
This model implies  that changes  in the risk premium  associated  with 
any asset, that is, its expected return  in excess of the riskless rate, will 
come either from changes in relative supplies or from changes in 
covariances.  For example,  what  is the effect of an increase  in the supply 
of asset i, Sit,  on Rjt, the required  return  on assetj? The answer  depends 
partly  on what  happens  to the coefficient  a as the supply  Si, and  therefore 
wealth, increases. If, for example, we assume constant relative risk 
aversion, with relative risk aversion coefficient k, the above equation 
becomes 
(8)  (R  it  -rt)  =k  (,Sit  )  (  i; Sj,t) 
so that 
(9)  Sit  [ko1j -  (Rjt -  rt)] 
An increase in the supply of any asset therefore  has two effects on 
equilibrium  rates  of return.  The first  is that  increasing  the relative  supply 
of this asset increases the required  return  on this asset and on all the 
assets that are close substitutes.  This effect is measured  by k oij:  if the 
covariance rij  is positive, the required  return  on assetj increases with 
an increase in Si. The second effect is that an increase in Si increases 
wealth,  increasing  the demand  for  all  assets and  decreasing  their  required 
returns; this effect is measured by  -  (Rjt -  rt)  for assetj.  The net effect 
is, in general,  ambiguous. 
Two recent empirical  studies have estimated  the variances, covari- 
ances and expected returns  required  to look at the effects of changes  in 
relative asset supplies on equilibrium  rates of return.33  Both find a 
32. For a statement  of assumptions  and a derivation,  see Robert  C. Merton, "An 
Intertemporal  Capital  Asset Pricing  Model,"  Econometrica,  vol. 41 (September  1973),  pp. 
867-87. 
33. J. Frankel,  "Empirically  Estimated  Portfolio  Crowding-out"  (University  of Cali- 
fornia, Berkeley, July 1983), and Benjamin  Friedman,  "Implications  of Debt-Equity 
Substitutability  for Interest  Rates and Corporate  Financing"  (National  Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic  Research,  August  1984).  Both studies  assume,  however,  that  U.S. portfolio  holders 
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positive but small  covariance  between rates  of return  on long  bonds  and 
equities. They both find, however, that when the wealth effect is taken 
into account, an increase in the supply  of long-term  government  bonds 
increases  the risk  premium  on bonds  but decreases the risk  premium  on 
equities.34  They also find that for plausible magnitudes  of change in 
supplies  and of coefficients  of relative  risk aversion,  the two effects are 
small. Moreover, the change in relative supplies  over the last six years 
is smaller  than is commonly perceived. Considering  only U.S. assets, 
the projected  increase  in government  debt over the next three  years, for 
example, is approximately  equal to the increase in the market  value of 
equity over the last eighteen months.  A more systematic  assessment of 
relative effects, beyond the scope of this paper, would require  taking 
account of the possibility  for domestic residents  to hold both domestic 
and  foreign  assets. 
Another  factor  which may have increased  risk  premiums  on bonds is 
an increase in the variances and covariances of asset returns. Bodie, 
Kane, and McDonald have recently argued that the increase in the 
variance of bond returns in the United States has, by raising their 
covariance with the market  portfolio, increased the risk premium  on 
bonds  and  thus  their  expected return.35  Using an estimate  of relative  risk 
aversion of 3.5, they conclude that increased risk could explain an 
increase  of 370  basis points in the one-period  rate of return  on bonds of 
eight-year  duration. 
Figure  4 presents time series for the rolling  variances  of real rates of 
return  on medium-term  bonds for all six countries.  The variance  at time 
t is computed  using observations  from the last twelve quarters.  Results 
for the United States are similar  both qualitatively  and  quantitatively  to 
those of Bodie, Kane, and McDonald  showing a sharp  increase in the 
variance after 1979. Except for Japan, this increase in the variance 
occurs in other countries, although  with different  timing and smaller 
magnitude. In all these countries, however, the estimated variance 
decreases substantially  in 1983. 
This suggests  that  increases  in the variance  of return  may  account  for 
part  of the increase  in long real  rates  in five of the six countries,  but two 
34. Estimates  from  Frankel,  "Portfolio  Crowding-out,"  imply  that  a 1  percent  increase 
in public  debt  raises  the risk  premium  on pulic  debt  by less than 1  basis point. 
35. Z. Bodie, A. Kane, and R. McDonald,  "Why  are Real Interest  Rates So High?" 
(Boston  University,  School  of Management,  April  1983). Figure 4.  Rolling Variance of Real Holding Returns on Bonds, 1973-84a 
Source: Same as in figure 1. 
a.  Rates of return are in percent at annual rates and deflated by the domestic  CPI. 314  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
caveats are in order. First, there is an important  distinction  between 
one-period  required  rates  of return  and  long-term  bond  yields. The yield 
on a bond  is the average  of the current  one-period  rate  and  of one-period 
rates of return  expected to prevail  over the life of the bond. Even if the 
variance  of rates of return  on long bonds is expected to remain  constant 
in the future, the one-period rate of return on any finite maturity 
instrument  would be expected to fall as it approached  maturity.  Thus 
the yield would increase by far less than the estimated  one-period  risk 
premium  increase  given by Bodie, Kane, and  McDonald.  Furthermore, 
there  is no reason  for market  participants  to assume  that  any increase  in 
variance  is permanent.  Indeed, time series evidence on the movement 
of the variance  suggests  that  variance  is only weakly serially  correlated. 
Therefore, if market participants  expect the variance to return to a 
"normal"  level in the future, the risk premium  in yields on long-term 
bonds may be substantially  smaller  than the estimate of Bodie, Kane, 
and  McDonald.36 
The second caveat is at least as important  as the first. It is that the 
one-period  capital  asset pricing  model may be misleading  in evaluating 
the risk associated with holding  bonds. In the absence of inflation  risk, 
long-term  bonds  allow  portfolio  holders  to avoid  the risk  associated  with 
rolling over short maturity  bonds: their return  at maturity  is fixed in 
terms  of consumption.  Thus  an increase  in the variance  of rates  and  thus 
in the variance  of the one-period  rate of return  on long bonds does not 
necessarily  imply  higher  risk on long bonds.37  If, however, the variance 
of rates of return  on bonds comes from inflation  variance, long bonds 
then are truly  more  risky and  will require  a higher  risk  premium. 
An alternative  explanation  for both high real rates and the strong 
36. This  is discussed  in more  detail  in "The  Persistence  of Volatility  and  Stock  Market 
Fluctuations,"  by J. Poterba  and L. Summers  (Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 
September  1984).  This paper  finds litle persistence  in stock volatility.  Work  in progress 
suggests  similar  conclusions  for bonds. 
37. Although  holding  bonds  of maturity  N guarantees  one unit  of consumption  at time 
N, rolling  over of shorter  maturity  bonds  may  sometimes  be a better  strategy.  This  would 
be the case if the rollover  strategy  tends to do unexpectedly  well when consumption  is 
unexpectedly  low at time N; in this case the rollover  strategy  provides  a better hedge. 
There will then be a positive premium  required  to hold long bonds. John Y. Campbell, 
"Risk Premiums  on Stocks and Real Bonds in a Simple Exchange  Model" (Princeton 
University,  August 1984),  presents  a simple analysis  of risk premiums  in a multiperiod 
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performance  of the stock market  was proposed  by Modigliani  and  Cohn 
to explain  the poor performance  of the stock market  in the 1970s.38  The 
authors  suggest  that financial  markets  exhibit  inflation  illusion,  a confu- 
sion of the distinction  between nominal  and real returns.  As a conse- 
quence, markets compare dividend or earning yields on stock with 
nominal  rather  than  real  interest  rates. On  this  view, a period  of declining 
inflation  would witness rising real interest rates and stock prices but 
falling nominal rates. This corresponds roughly to  what has been 
observed. The inflation illusion hypothesis is also consistent with a 
general  failure  of rates to fully adjust  to taxes and  inflation39  and  the poor 
performance  around  the world of equities as an inflation  hedge. Note 
that  the level of long-term  nominal  interest  rates  in  most  countries  peaked 
in 1982,just  before  the major  stock market  rallies  began.  This  is precisely 
what  the inflation  illusion  hypothesis  would  predict.  The  inflation  illusion 
view also explains the high current level  of real interest rates by 
suggesting  that  real  rates  throughout  the 1970s  were  artificially  depressed 
by inflation. Had economic decisionmakers  understood  the effects of 
inflation,  nominal  rates would have been even higher. 
Although  inflation  illusion  can rationalize  actual  developments,  it has 
problems as a working hypothesis. Most obviously, if stock market 
investors were fooled by inflation  during  the 1970s,  why were investors 
in residential real estate not fooled? Average citizens should, on the 
inflation  illusion  view, have overestimated  mortgage  burdens  and  under- 
estimated  the value of the residential  housing  stock. Finally, microeco- 
nomic evidence on the inflation  illusion hypothesis is rather mixed.40 
Thus  despite  its ability  to explain  recent movements  in asset returns,  we 
are still reluctant  to accept it. 
Overall,  we see the empirical  evidence on portfolio shifts as mostly 
inconclusive. However, portfolio shifts and changes in risk premiums 
are  always  difficult  to identify,  and  some of the evidence  on the variances 
of bond  returns  and  on the inflation  illusion  hypothesis  can be interpreted 
as providing  some support  for the portfolio-shift  explanation. 
38. Franco  Modigliani  and  Richard  A. Cohn, "Inflation,  Rational  Valuation,  and  the 
Market,"  Financial  Analysts  Journal,  vol. 35 (March-April  1979),  pp. 24-44. 
39. See Summers,  "The Non-Adjustment  of Nominal  Interest  Rates." 
40. See Lawrence Summers,  "Inflation  and the Valuation  of Corporate  Equities," 
Working  Paper  824  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  December  1981). 316  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1984 
Summary 
We started  by reviewing  the behavior  of asset prices  and  returns  since 
1978.  Our  main  conclusion  was that,  although  short-term,  medium-term, 
and  probably  long-term  real rates had substantially  increased,  required 
rates  of return  on stocks had  apparently  not followed;  the stock markets 
had  been surprisingly  strong.  We then identified  four  factors  that could 
in theory  account  for the high  real  interest  rates:  adverse  shifts  in saving, 
favorable shifts in profitability,  tight money, and portfolio shifts. We 
found  that  they had  different  theoretical  implications  for the behavior  of 
stock prices. In particular,  adverse shifts in saving  or tight  money could 
not explain the strong stock market,  whereas  profitability  increases or 
portfolio  shifts, through  changes  in risk  premiums,  could. 
We then turned  to an empirical  examination  of the potential  role of 
each of these four factors. Starting  with fiscal policy, we found no 
evidence in favor of the thesis that deficits  are leading  to low saving:  in 
the OECD as a whole, there has been little change in structural  public 
dissaving and there is no reason to think that the future will be any 
different.  As for a shift in profitability,  although  it is difficult  to pinpoint 
the origins  of such shifts, the strong  behavior  of investment  in the face 
of high real rates suggests that one has taken place. Turning  to tight 
money, we found  no reason  to doubt  that  tight  money is responsible  for 
the initial increase in real rates, approximately  from 1978  to 1982. For 
the  post-1982  period,  two fiscal-monetary  mix  explanations  are  plausible: 
tight  European  money  used to counteract  the dollar  appreciation  coming 
from  the divergence  in fiscal  policies in the United  States  and  elsewhere, 
or tight  anticipated  money as the U.S. economy nears  full employment. 
Last, we looked at the potential role of portfolio shifts; although  we 
found  little evidence in their  favor, it is difficult  to identify  such  portfolio 
effects, and the evidence can be interpreted  as inconclusive  rather  than 
negative. 
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. High real rates 
are not due to fiscal policy alone. They are probably  partly due to a 
fiscal-monetary  mix, and  smaller  U. S. deficits  would,  other  things  equal, 
bring  down interest  rates. Interest  rates  would, therefore,  decline either 
if Europe  accepted further  depreciation  or if the U.S. recovery slowed 
down  so that  U. S. monetary  policy was not anticipated  to tighten  further. Olivier J. Blanchard  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  317 
Underlying  these developments  and  explaining  the performance  both  of 
stock markets  and of investment  is a shift in profitability.  This suggests 
that, were the other factors to disappear, real rates would probably 
remain  higher  than  in the 1970s. 
APPENDIX 
A Measure of Fiscal Stance 
As WE  NOTED in the text,  measuring  the impact of fiscal policy on 
aggregate  demand  merely by looking at current  deficits is only a rough 
first approximation.  Quite apart from the varying effects of different 
taxes or spending programs,  perceptions of future deficits must also 
affect  aggregate  demand.  We derive  here a more  attractive  measure  and 
construct  its empirical  counterparts  for the countries  considered  in this 
paper. 
Let G be government  spending  on goods and services, Ttaxes, and  B 
debt. The deficit is therefore rB +  G -  T, where r is the real interest 
rate and the primary  deficit,  D, is equal to G -  T. Fiscal policy affects 
aggregate  demand  both directly through  G and indirectly  through  con- 
sumption,  which depends on taxes and debt; thus, to characterize  its 
effect, we must  specify  consumption  behavior.4'  We  postulate  a standard 
life-cycle consumption  function relating  consumption  to wealth, both 
human  and financial: 
(10)  C = X[K + B + H(W -  T;  r+p)], 
where C is consumption,  X  is the marginal  propensity  to consume  out of 
wealth, K is the capital stock, so that K + B is nonhuman  wealth, and 
W  is labor  income, so that W -  T  is after-tax  labor  income. Notation of 
the form H(a;b) denotes the present value of a stream  a discounted  at 
rate b. Thus Hl(W  -  T;r+p) is the present value of after-tax labor 
41. This  makes  clear  that  any measure  of fiscal  stance  depends  implicitly  or explicitly 
on a specification  of consumption  behavior  and  is therefore  theory  specific.  This  point  has 
been  made  by Alan S. Blinder  and  Robert  M. Solow, in The  Economics  of Public  Finance 
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income, discounted  not at rate r but at rate r + p. We may think  of p as 
a myopia coefficient, reflecting  the mortality  of current  consumers or 
their systematic myopia about the future;  it will play an important  role 
in what  follows. This way of introducing  myopia  is by no means  the only 
one. Consumers  may discount  labor  income  and  taxes at different  rates; 
they may have static expectations  of future  taxes but be more sophisti- 
cated  in  forming  expectations  of future  labor  income.  We  think,  however, 
that our specification captures an essential element, namely myopia 
about the future. Finally, in order  to focus on implications  of forward- 
looking  behavior,  we ignore  liquidity  constraints.42 
Collecting  terms in aggregate  demand  that depend directly on fiscal 
policy gives 
(11)  X  X[B -  H(T;r  + p)]  +  G. 
Adding and subtracting the present value of government spending 
discounted  at rate  r + p gives 
(12)  X=  X[B +  H(D;r+p)]  +  [G -  XH(G;r+p)]. 
Equation  12  provides a basis for thinking  about  the effects of a fiscal 
program  on aggregate  demand.  Before  we do so, we note that  the choices 
of B, G, and T (equivalently  D) by the government  are not independent. 
The dynamic  budget  constraint  faced by the government  is: 
dD/dt =  rD +  G -  T. 
If we assume that the government  does not intend to let its debt grow 
forever faster than the rate of interest, the government  is then con- 
strained  by an intertemporal  budget  constraint: 
(13)  B +  H(D; r) =  0. 
A  positive level  of  debt must be  offset by prospective primary 
surpluses in the future.43  Debt must be equal to the present value of 
future  primary  surpluses, discounted  at the market  interest rate r. We 
42. The  consumptionfunctionofequation  lOisformallyderivedinOlivierJ.  Blanchard, 
"Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons," Journal  of Political Economy,  forthcoming.  The 
extension  to the case where  some consumers  are liquidity  constrained  is given in Willem 
Buiter, "Measuring  Aspects of Fiscal and Financial  Policy," paper prepared  for the 
February  1984  ISPE  conference  on public  debt. 
43. Note that  the measure  of fiscal  policy derived  above does not depend  on whether 
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now return to equation 12. The first term represents the effects of 
government  finance.  If spending  is always  financed  by concurrent  taxes, 
then it is identically  equal  to zero; if consumers  are not myopic, that is, 
if p is zero and the fiscal program  satisfies  the intertemporal  constraint 
of equation  13, then the government  finance  term  is still zero: 
B +  H(D; r+p)  = B  +  H(D; r) = 0. 
This is the well-known "Ricardian  equivalence" proposition. If con- 
sumers  discount  future  taxes at the interest  rate, the timing  of finance  is 
irrelevant;  all that matters is the path of spending. If, however, as is 
likely,  p is positive, the finance  term  is not zero. In particular  a sequence 
of large  anticipated  deficits  will increase  this  term  and  increase  aggregate 
demand.  Although  consumers  recognize that taxes will be raised  even- 
tually,  it is far  enough  in  the  future  that  it  does not  affect  their  consumption 
very much. This first term makes clear that both the level of debt and 
the sequence of anticipated  deficits  affect aggregate  demand. 
The second term of equation 12 characterizes  the effects of govern- 
ment spending  if financed  by concurrent  taxes. The level of spending 
has an ambiguous  effect on aggregate  demand;  the sign of the effect 
depends on the specific values of X,  p, and interest rates. The path of 
spending also affects aggregate demand. A prospective increase in 
spending if financed by concurrent  taxes implies higher prospective 
taxes. Consumers  anticipate  these higher  taxes and reduce their con- 
sumption.  Therefore  the effect of a prospective  increase  in spending  is 
contractionary  and that  of a prospective  decrease  expansionary. 
Empirical Implementation 
In constructing  an empirical  counterpart  to X, we focus only on the 
first  term  of equation  12, the finance  component.  We do this because of 
the conceptual problems associated with the choice of the empirical 
counterpart  to G and  because of the lack of reliable  forecasts of G. 
Our first step is to divide X, B, and D by GNP. Denoting ratios of 
these variables  to GNP by lowercase  letters  gives 
(14)  x =  X[b +  H(d; r +p-g)]. 
The  coefficient  g is the rate  of growth  of GNP. We then  assume  r, p, and 320  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
g to be constant  through  time; this is simpler  than  to allow them  to vary 
and does not affect the time path of the index substantially.  Last, we 
assume that r +  p  -  g is equal to 10 percent per year. Choosing a 
different  value, say 6 percent, affects the level of the index but has little 
effect on its time path." The empirical  index is thus 
(15)  x, = X(bt  + E  (1.I)'-idt,t+i) 
i=o 
where d,,,+i  is the forecast of the ratio of the primary  deficit  to GNP in 
year t + i, as of time t. 
The U.S. Fiscal Index 
We construct  the U.S. fiscal index as follows. For the years 1978  to 
1984  we use for b,  general  government  net financial  liabilities  as a percent 
of GDP.4s  For each year t, we use DRI's midyear  t forecasts of ratios  of 
primary  deficits to GNP for years t to t +  11. Primary  deficits are the 
sum of federal, state, and local government  deficits as defined in the 
national income accounts, minus the sum of federal, state, and local 
government  net interest  payments. Ratios of deficits to GNP for years 
t + i, i >  11, are assumed equal to the forecast for year t +  11. (The 
relative  weight  of the first  twelve years is 65 percent.) 
We also construct  forecasts, as of mid-1984,  of future  values of the 
fiscal index for the years 1985  to 1990.  To construct  the year t forecast, 
we use mid-1984  DRI forecasts of ratios of primary  deficits  to GNP for 
years t to t + 11. We construct  forecasts of b, by using  the identity 
(16)  bt+I  =  (1 +  r, -  gt)  bt  -  dt. 
To construct  forecasts of b, for the years 1984  to 1989  we use for d, 
the DRI forecasts of ratios  of primary  deficits  to GNP and  for g, the DRI 
forecasts of real output  growth. Because part  of government  debt does 
not bear interest, the average  interest  real  rate r, on government  debt is 
lower than the market  real rate. We compute r, as the ratio of OECD 
44. The value of 10 percent is based on Hayashi's estimates of the consumption 
fuinction  specified  in equation  10. His estimates  (no liquidity  constraints)  imply,  at annual 
rates,  p = 0.10, r = 0.03 (Fumio  Hayashi,  "The  Permanent  Income  Hypothesis"). 
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forecasts  of real  interest  payments  on government  debt  for 1985  divided 
by OECD  forecasts of beginning-of-year  1985  debt.46  This gives a value 
for r of 4.4 percent. We assume r, equals this value for all years 1984  to 
1989;  this allows us to construct  a series of forecasts  for b and the fiscal 
index. Table  A-I presents  the results  for the United  States (as well as for 
Europe,  Japan,  and  the six-country  aggregate,  the calculations  for  which 
are discussed below). The results suggest a steady increase  in the U.S. 
fiscal index from 1979  to 1983,  followed by a slow decrease from 1984 
onward.  As we already  discussed in the text, it is important  to note that 
the movement  from 1983  to 1984  is due to the relative  optimism  of the 
mid-1984  DRI forecasts. If we used 1984 CBO baseline projections 
instead, the value of the index would not decline  by as much  after 1983. 
It would  show values of H(d)  for 1984  and  following  years  approximately 
equal  to those of 1983. 
As it is, the index shows a major  fiscal expansion  from 1979  to 1983, 
with a particularly  large  increase  in 1983.  The year 1983  is the only one 
for which the present value of primary  deficits is positive. The index 
decreases in 1984  and stabilizes at a high level. If we assume that the 
marginal  propensity  to consume out of wealth, X, is equal to 0.1, then 
the U.S. fiscal  index column  of table 13  suggests  that  the change  in fiscal 
program  from 1979  to 1984  had a direct  impact  on aggregate  demand  of 
1.8 percent. Of this, 0.4 percent  was due to the buildup  in debt and the 
rest to anticipations  of larger  deficits. 
Fiscal Indexes for Europe and Japan 
Medium-term  and long-term  forecasts of future  primary  deficits are 
not available  on a consistent basis for the period 1978-84  for countries 
other than the United States. (One-year-ahead  forecasts of deficits are 
available  from the OECD.) This forces us to take a different  approach. 
For each of the European  countries,  for each year t, we form  forecasts 
of deficits by using d,,,,i  =  d, +  a(u,,,+i -  u,), where t =  1978 to 1984. 
The variable  d, is the ratio of the general  government  primary  deficit 
to GNP  for 1978  to 1984.47  The  variable  u, ,+iis the  midyear  t DRI  forecast 
46. OECD  Economic  Outlook,  July 1984. 
47. For 1978-83,  from  OECD,  "Structural  Budget  Deficits,"  and  for 1984,  from  OECD 
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of the unemployment  rate for year t + i. The coefficient  cx  captures  the 
effect of the level of economic activity  on dt:  if unemployment  increases 
by 1  percent,  the ratio  of primary  deficit  to GNP increases  by cx  percent. 
We choose cx  to be 0.7 for the United Kingdom  and  West Germany,  and 
1.0 for France and Italy; these values are consistent with standard 
cyclical adjustments  for these countries.  We also construct  forecasts of 
the fiscal index, for each country,  for t =  1985  to 1989.  To do so we use 
the following  formula  for the mid-1984  forecasts of dt+i: 
(17)  d84t+i=  d84,85  +  Ot(u84,t+i-  U848) 
Values of 1984  forecasts of primary  deficits  and  of unemployment  for 
1985  are  obtained  from  the OECD  Economic  Outlook,  July 1984.  Values 
of u84,t+i are mid-1984  DRI forecasts. Values of bt  for 1978  to 1984  are 
obtained  from OECD, "Structural  Budget  Deficits." Forecasts  of bt  for 
1985  to 1990  are constructed  in the same way as for the United States, 
using mid-1984  DRI forecasts of growth; real interest rates are also 
constructed  as they were for the United States. The real interest rates 
so constructed are equal to 3.0 percent for France, 4.1 percent for 
Germany,  4.1 percent  for  the United Kingdom,  and  3.7 percent  for Italy. 
This description  makes  clear  that  the constructed  indexes for Europe 
do not  take  into  account  anticipated  structural  changes  in  primary  deficits 
but only changes  due to anticipated  movements  in output.  The index  for 
France decreases from 1978 to 1980;  the increase from 1980 to 1983 
corresponds  to the socialist fiscal expansion of 1981-82; the index is 
anticipated  to increase slightly  from 1983  onward,  due to the buildup  of 
debt. The index for West Germany  shows steady contraction  from 1981 
onward.  The index for the United Kingdom  shows a large contraction 
from 1978  to 1982,  fiscal expansion  in 1983,  and anticipated  contraction 
for the future.  The index  for Italy shows a steady  increase,  the net result 
of decreasing  anticipated  deficits  and steadily  increasing  debt. 
Medium-term  and  long-term  forecasts of primary  deficits  or GNP are 
not available  on a consistent basis from 1978  for Japan.  Thus our index 
for Japan  is constructed  in a very crude  way. We assume that the ratio 
of the primary  deficit  to GNP is always expected to be constant.  Values 
of bt and dt for years 1978 to  1984 are obtained from the OECD's 
"Structural  Budget  Deficits." Values of bt  for 1985  to 1990  are obtained 
in the same way as for the United States, using  mid-1984  DRI forecasts 
of GNP  growth.  The real  interest  rate  on government  debt is taken  to be 324  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
4.2 percent. The results show steady fiscal contraction  since 1978;  the 
increase  in debt is more  than  offset by the sharp  decrease  in anticipated 
deficits. 
Last, we construct the fiscal index for the group of countries as a 
whole (the last column of table A-1); for 1978-83 we use contempora- 
neous exchange rates and thereafter 1983 exchange rates and GNP. 
Except for 1983, the overall index shows little movement, confirming 
the conclusion obtained  using the text's cruder  structural  deficit  meas- 
ures. Comments 
and Discussion 
Alan S. Blinder: Three  nights  ago at a cocktail  party  in Paris,  two local 
journalists  approached  me-I  was virtually  the only macroeconomist  at 
the conference-to  ask the question  that  all  journalists  seem to ask these 
days: why are real interest  rates so high, and  to what  extent is the U.S. 
budget  deficit  to blame? 
I gave them what I took to be the standard  response of mainstream 
economists: real rates are high because of unrelentingly  tight money in 
the United States since 1979 (except for a brief hiatus in the last six 
months  of 1982),  which, among  other  things,  has forced  many  European 
countries into tight money in order to defend their currency values. 
Since 1982, tight money has been coupled with a large fiscal stimulus 
from  President  Reagan's  program,  a stimulus  that  has grown  larger  over 
time. High real interest  rates are exactly what one expects from such a 
policy mix. 
If pressed further,  I would have added something  about higher  risk 
premiums  in long-term  bond rates and something  about  financial  dereg- 
ulation  in the United States. But I was not. Being tired and under  the 
influence  of champagne,  it did not occur to me to mention  either  the end 
of OPEC's surplus  or the worldwide  investment  boom. But perhaps  I 
should  have. 
I certainly  did not think, either  then or now, that there was anything 
original  in my response. Rather, I thought myself to be reciting the 
canonical answer. In this thoughtful and thought-provoking  paper, 
Olivier  Blanchard  and Lawrence Summers  claim that there are a few 
problems  with this standard  story. 
First, since money is presumably  neutral  in the long run, high real 
short rates caused by tight money ought to be accompanied by a 
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descending  real yield curve. Yet real  long rates appear  to be higher  than 
real short  rates. 
Second, stock markets  have boomed  throughout  the  world  since 1982, 
which  is not what we expect to happen  when money is tight. 
Third,  the U.S. fiscal expansion  was largely  offset by fiscal contrac- 
tions in other OECD countries, leaving little if any net world fiscal 
expansion. 
Each of these developments appears to be at variance with the 
standard  story. Yet, by the end of the paper, Blanchard  and Summers 
seem to have more  or less agreed  with  what  I told the French  journalists. 
Let me take each of the problems  in turn. 
Not even two economists as ingenious as Blanchard  and Summers 
know what the term structure  of real interest rates is-except  (as they 
point out) in the United Kingdom.  Since we can make better estimates 
of real short rates than of real long rates, most economists pay more 
attention  to the  former  even though  the  latter  are  arguably  more  important 
for economic activity. 
Blanchard  and  Summers's  numbers  illustratejust  how hard  it is to pin 
down  even real  short  rates. Look at the  table  below, which  is constructed 
from numbers  in Blanchard  and Summers's  tables 1 and 2. It gives the 
estimated  changes  in real short  interest  rates  over two different  intervals 
according  to the two different  estimation  methods  they use. From 1978 
to 1984, which is the period on which they focus, the real short  rate in 
the United Kingdom  went up  by either  8.2 points  or 2.3 points  depending 
on how you measure  it. Between 1980  and 1983,  which  for reasons  to be 
explained  later  is the period  I prefer,  the real  short  rate  in West Germany 
United  West  United 
States  France  Germany  Kingdom  Italy  Japan 
Changes,  1978-84 
With  DRI forecast 
for inflation  4.9  6.1  5.8  8.2  2.6  7.2 
With  statistical 
forecast  for 
inflation  4.3  4.3  1.8  2.3  5.9  9.6 
Changes,  1980-83 
With  DRI  forecast 
for inflation  2.9  0.4  1.9  4.4  6.1  3.5 
With  statistical 
forecast  for 
inflation  4.3  4.2  -1.8  1.4  3.2  -0.5 Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence  H.  Summers  327 
either rose  1.9 points or fell  1.8 points! Such examples could be 
multiplied. 
The  conclusion  is obvious:  the margin  of uncertainty  in deciding  what 
has happened  even to real short rates is enormous. How much larger, 
therefore,  must  our margin  of error  be in estimating  real  long rates? 
For  Britain,  Blanchard  and  Summers  offer  us direct  measurements  of 
real long rates, which we can compare  with their estimates. For 1982, 
their estimate of the five-year real rate is 0.6 percent using statistical 
forecasts  of inflation  (table  3) or 5.3 percent  using  DRI's forecasts (table 
4). That is quite a discrepancy, which simply reiterates  the previous 
point. Since the corresponding  estimated  short  rates  are 1.5  percent  and 
4.2 percent,  their  estimated  yield  curve  is either  ascending  or  descending, 
depending  on the measurement  technique!  Which  answer is right?  We 
can see in their table 5 that the true observed real rate on a six-year 
indexed bond at the time was 2.9 percent or 2.7 percent. But to which 
short  rate (1.5 percent  or 4.2 percent)  should  it be compared? 
My  point  here  is not  to criticize  Blanchard  and  Summers's  procedures; 
mine wouldn't  be any better. My point is that inferring  the slope of the 
term structure  of real interest  rates is a hazardous  and  probably  impos- 
sible enterprise  in the absence of indexed bonds. In the one case for 
which we have genuine  data, Britain  in 1981-84,  table  5 clearly  shows a 
mostly descending  yield curve most of the time. 
Furthermore,  as Blanchard  and  Summers  correctly  state, the horizon 
over which money should  not affect real  interest  rates  is long relative  to 
the weighted average of expected returns  that is embodied  in five-to- 
seven year bond rates. In the British  case, table 5 shows that the rise in 
real rates was far smaller at truly long maturities than at medium 
maturities. 
So it seems to me that Blanchard  and Summers  have little basis for 
claiming  that the real yield curve sloped  the "wrong"  way. The interest 
rate  data  give little reason  to question  the tight  money  explanation. 
After listening to Robert Shiller's paper earlier at this conference, 
one might  legitimately  wonder  why we should  spend  any time worrying 
about  the behavior  of stock market  prices  in this context. But Blanchard 
and  Summers  do, so let me address  their  question  directly:  if tight  money 
and large deficits caused high real long rates, why would the stock 
market  boom? 
Let's first review what actually  happened  to the U.S. stock market 
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1981  and into 1982  despite the election of the most capitalist-intensive 
president  since Coolidge-even  though  the new president  set about to 
cut every tax on capital  that  he could  think  of. That  does seem  puzzling- 
until  you realize  that  Wall  Street  was worried  sick about  the current  and 
impending  budget  deficits. 
Then the stock market staged the strong rally that Blanchard  and 
Summers  focus upon. But note that this rally took place (1) right  after 
passage  of a major  deficit-reduction  bill, (2)  just as the Federal  Reserve 
was loosening up on money and allowing  interest  rates to fall dramati- 
cally, and (3) in anticipation  of a cyclical recovery. This is unusual 
behavior? 
Now, it may  well be, as Blanchard  and  Summers  claim,  that  the stock 
market  boom was too large to be explained  by the events I have just 
mentioned.  And it certainly  was too large  to be explained  by improved 
dividend prospects. But what's new about that? The stock market 
overreacts  to anything  and everything.  Why should the 1982-83  boom 
have been different? 
In addition,  it is worth  noting  that  the market  tumbled  again  from  mid- 
1983  to mid-1984-an episode Blanchard  and Summers  ignore  and  that 
somehow does not even show up on their  chart.  Between July 1983  and 
July 1984, the real New  York Stock Exchange composite average 
(deflated  by the CPI)  declined 13.6  percent,  bringing  it almost  back  to its 
1978  level. 
So, taking  the 1981-84  period  as a whole, it is far  from  clear  that  there 
is  anything in stock market behavior that strongly contradicts the 
standard  story. 
Besides, as Blanchard  and  Summers  mention  at  the end  of their  paper, 
the Modigliani-Cohn  hypothesis  of inflation  illusion  provides  a perfectly 
coherent  explanation  of just about every major  movement  of the stock 
market  in the past dozen years-and  of other  phenomena  as well. This 
is no mean achievement!  It is true that the inflation  illusion  hypothesis 
does not explain  why home buyers  failed to overestimate  the real rates 
implied  by high  nominal  mortgage  interest  rates  in the 1970s.  But it does 
seem to me that Blanchard  and Summers  dismiss a rather  promising 
explanation  much  too cavalierly. 
In table 10, Blanchard  and Summers  contrast  the change  in the fiscal 
posture  of the United States (first  column)  with that  of the "world" as a 
whole (last column). After adjustment  for stage of the business cycle 
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0.5 percent  of GNP in 1978  to a deficit  of 1.3 percent  of GNP in 1984- 
an  expansionary  change  of 1.8  percent  of GNP. But  for  the seven-country 
"world," the corresponding  shift was a decline in the deficit from 1.6 
percent to only 0.8 percent of GNP-a  contractionary  change of 0.8 
percent  of GNP. So Blanchard  and  Summers  conclude  that  there  was no 
fiscal stimulus  in the world as a whole and, hence, that budget  deficits 
can hardly  account  for high  interest  rates. 
I dispute  this conclusion  for at least two important  reasons. First, if 
we treat the OPEC surplus in parallel with budget positions in the 
industrial  countries, the picture changes considerably.  The "world" 
deficit  starting  from  the time of the second OPEC  oil shock now changes 
from  a surplus  of 1.2  percent  of GNP in 1979-80  to a deficit  of 1.2  percent 
of GNP in 1983-84. 
Second, the "fiscal expansion" part of the standard  story probably 
does not start before 1981  and certainly  not before 1980. No one has 
claimed  that  the huge  budget  "deficits"  of the Carter  years (which  were 
surpluses  on a high-employment,  inflation-adjusted  basis) drove up real 
interest  rates. If we change  the comparison  period  from 1978-84  (Blan- 
chard and Summers's choice) to  1980-83, U.S.  fiscal policy moved 
toward deficit by 2.3 percent of GNP (from + 1.1 to -  1.2) and world 
fiscal  policy moved toward  deficit  by 1.2 percent  of GNP (from + 0.1 to 
-  1.1). Since the U.S. economy  constitutes  roughly  half  of this "world," 
these numbers  imply  that  there  was no offset to expansionary  U.S. fiscal 
policy coming  from  Europe  and  Japan  during  the 1980-83  period. 
This conclusion could hardly  be more different  from the one drawn 
by Blanchard  and Summers.  To me, the data on fiscal deficits actually 
support  the standard  story rather  than  undermine  it. 
Blanchard  and Summers  worry  too much. It is true  that  the standard 
story  has some loose ends, which  they point  out honestly, skillfully,  and 
perceptively.  I learned  a good deal by reading  the paper.  But taken  as a 
whole, their exhaustive and excellent tour  of the theoretical  arguments 
and  empirical  evidence mainly  supports  the standard  story. It  really  does 
look as though  a policy mix of tight money (especially  early)  and loose 
fiscal policy (especially late, and in the future)  pushed  world real rates 
up and  kept them  there. 
Blanchard  and  Summers's  list of nagging  worries  is more  nagging  than 
worrisome.  Over the relevant  period, fiscal  policy certainly  was expan- 
sionary.  And the term  structure  of interest  rates  does not point  the finger 
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is harder  to explain. But they probably  should  leave that to Modigliani 
and  Cohn-maybe even to Shiller. 
William D. Nordhaus: The last half-dozen  years have been very puz- 
zling for observers of financial  markets.  One of the puzzles, which has 
been responsible  for more than its share of spilt ink, is the rise in real 
interest  rates since 1979. 
Among mainstream macroeconomists, the canonical explanation 
probably  runs  as follows. A combination  of external  and  internal  events 
left the United States in 1979  with  intolerably  high  inflation  and  a gradual 
updrift  in the size of the structural  budget deficit relative to GNP. In 
October 1979  the Federal Reserve grasped  the nettle of a monetarist- 
style disinflation.  Nominal and real interest rates rose and the dollar 
skyrocketed  as the economy was driven  into a deep  recession. We might 
have expected real  interest  rates to fall as inflation  was routed.  They did 
not, in the canonical view, because loose fiscal policy led to a higher 
equilibrium  level of real interest  rates. 
The paper by Blanchard  and Summers  does not really dispute this 
canonical  mainstream  interpretation.  Rather,  they amplify  and flesh it 
out; point  out some puzzles unexplained  by it; and  poke holes in several 
competing  explanations.  Overall  the paper  is a thorough  and balanced 
analysis  of the high-real-rate  puzzle. 
Among  other  puzzles, three  are noteworthy.  First, one of the lines of 
argument  of many analysts (including  the Feldstein-Mondale  school) is 
that the high real interest rates are caused by high future deficits. 
Blanchard  and Summers argue that, from a global perspective, the 
presumption  behind  this argument  is questionable.  In a world  of highly 
mobile funds, interest rates should be determined  by global monetary 
and fiscal policy. Global fiscal policy has been either neutral  or mildly 
expansionary  over the period since 1978.  If we look at the period  when 
real interest  rates were rising, however, from 1980  on, fiscal  policy was 
indeed expansionary.  The issue is whether  the small degree of expan- 
sionary  impulse  from fiscal policy could have been responsible  for the 
rise in real  rates. This is still an open question. 
Second, Blanchard  and Summers  point out that the canonical  story 
has several difficulties in explaining the timing of real interest rate 
movements and particularly  why high rates lasted so long. In the end 
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a bit. From 1979  to 1982  was a period  of "disinflationary  monetarism," 
in which real interest  rates were high as the Federal  Reserve tightened 
money to drive down inflation.  Since 1982,  however, a different  force 
has been at work-one  that might  be called "preemptive  monetarism." 
During  this period, the Federal Reserve has been forced to keep real 
interest rates high to preempt  the actual or prospective effects of the 
stimulative  U.S.  fiscal policy. In part, the Federal Reserve seems to 
have been threatening  the Congress  with the prospect  that  real interest 
rates would stay high until the deficit was reduced; to some extent, 
particularly  during  1983  and 1984,  real  interest  rates were high  because, 
given the high fiscal deficit, the Federal Reserve's unemployment  and 
inflation  targets  could  be met only with  relatively  high  real  interest  rates. 
As long as the Federal Reserve is pursuing  ultimate targets that are 
affected  by fiscal  policy-targets  such as prices, output,  and  unemploy- 
ment-a  fiscal expansion will raise real interest rates as the Federal 
Reserve  reacts, choking  off interest-sensitive  demands  to offset the fiscal 
stimulus. 
Another  piece of information  about  the source  of the high  real  interest 
rates lies in the term structure  of interest  rates. Say we start  with a flat 
term  structure.  A strategy  of disinflationary  monetarism  should  have led 
to a declining  term structure  (indeed  future  implicit  nominal  short rates 
should  decline). This appears  to have occurred  in 1979-81. Preemptive 
monetarism,  however, would  lead  to a flat  or  rising  yield  curve  depending 
on the timing  of fiscal expansion. There is some evidence of an upward 
tilt in the term structure  after 1981. 
One  place where  the authors'  argument  misses the mark  concerns  the 
risk premium  on long-term  bonds. Before 1979  the one-month  holding 
returns  on long bonds were virtually  independent  of holding  returns  on 
other assets. Since 1979,  long bonds appear  to have assumed  about as 
much short-term  market  risk as stocks. If we put any faith in a capital 
asset pricing  model  (CAPM),  then after 1979  we should  see a substantial 
risk  premium  of perhaps  200  or  300  basis  points  on long  bonds.  Blanchard 
and Summers  use a consumption  CAPM to discredit such a thought. 
This is not an informative  test, because the consumption  CAPM has 
been  shown  to be a useless model  for  predicting  the risk  premia  on assets 
like common stocks. Only time will tell, but I believe that we will see a 
substantial  term premium  on long-term  bonds as long as they have the 
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But the heart of the Blanchard  and Summers  paper concerns the 
puzzle of surging  stock markets.  Clearly,  a monetary  disinflation  should 
be a triple whammy on real stock prices-it  would lower profits by 
lowering  aggregate  demand,  raise the discount  rate through  the interest 
rate  effect, and  further  lower stock prices as the high  dollar  reduces  the 
profitability  of domestic corporations.  But real stock prices have not 
fallen since October 1979.  What  was at work  here? 
Blanchard  and Summers  propose a "brave  new world" explanation. 
They argue  that  expected profits  rose more  than  enough  to offset the rise 
in real interest rates. What  forces might  have been at work? We have 
seen the lowering of capital taxes, the turn to the right in economic 
policy, dissipation  of the Carter  malaise, routing  of the last vestige of 
Mitterrand's  Keynesiosocialism, less uncertainty  about the future, a 
tough stand  against  unions (like the air  controllers),  perhaps  even some 
residual  jingoism  from imperialist  wars in the Falklands  and Grenada- 
these notches in the blazing guns of laissez faire heartened  the bulls 
and routed the bears. 0  brave new world of supply-side capitalism 
that has such wondrous  animal  spirits  in it! Thus spake Blanchard  and 
Summers. 
How seriously  should  we take  this  brave-new-world  view? It is surely 
ingenious,  but the evidence is pretty  thin. The first  issue is the signal-to- 
noise problem.  Stock prices are notoriously  badly  behaved. Should  we 
interpret  the stability  of stock markets  since 1979  as a measure  of rational 
forward-looking  investors, as Blanchard  and Summers  would tell the 
story?  Or  as a herd  of investors  whose mood inexplicably  turned  bullish 
over the last half decade, as Robert Shiller's paper in this issue might 
persuade  us? A glance at Shiller's figure 1 does not indicate that, in a 
historical  perspective,  the  last  few years  have  produced  an  extraordinary 
bull market. In short, given the volatility of stock markets,  we should 
give but a small weight to anomalous stock market  movements when 
other  features  of a theory appear  to fit the facts. 
Second, there is the expected-signal  problem.  Many  people feel that 
the stock  market  was significantly  undervalued  in 1979-as was indicated 
by a ratio  of market  value to replacement  cost of corporations  of 0.7. If 
the stock market  was indeed  undervalued,  then  the increase  in real  rates 
was battling  (weak)  market  forces tending  to correct  the undervaluation. 
Third, the timing of stock market movements does not match the 
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in which real interest rates were almost constant. But after the 1980 
Reagan  election stock prices fell about 30 percent in real terms as the 
supply-side  program  was proposed, marketed,  passed, and analyzed. 
Stock  prices  continued  to fall  till  summer  1982,  when  the Federal  Reserve 
reversed  its monetarist  operating  policies and eased money. Stock and 
bond prices rose sharply starting  in summer 1982 as expected future 
interest rates fell. In sum, there simply was no surge of stock prices 
during  the period  when  markets  were absorbing  the supply-side  policies. 
Lastly, the fundamental  hypothesis of an upturn  in expected profits 
is unsupported  by any evidence on expected profits.  One  can, however, 
examine long-term  profit  forecasts of groups like DRI to see whether 
there  is evidence of the posited upturn  and whether  changes  in forecast 
profits  appear  to explain  stock-market  movements. 
In general, DRI's profit  forecasts do not move in line with the story 
told by Blanchard  and Summers,  nor do they move with stock prices. 
Deflated  profits  after  taxes as forecast  by DRI for 1985  (call these " 1985 
profits") are virtually  constant during  the stock market  increase from 
1978  to the end of 1980;  1985  profits  then  fall  almost  continuously  through 
the summer  of 1984.  There  was no increase  in 1985  profits  to correspond 
to the dramatic  stock price increase  after  mid-1982. 
What should we conclude about the brave-new-world  view? In the 
end,  I  find the  two-stage mainstream argument more persuasive, 
although  there remain genuine puzzles in the movement of the stock 
market  and the dollar. 
Alas, no brave  new world  have we, 
Nay, 'tis the drab  old globe we see. 
The gallant  Fed drives  real  rates  high 
As structural  deficits  loom close by. 
General Discussion 
There were several objections to the reliance by Blanchard and 
Summers  on the "vigorous" stock market  as evidence that enhanced 
profitability  was  responsible for high interest rates. Robert Shiller 
pointed  out that the increase in the stock market  since 1982  is no more 
than a small wiggle in historical  perspective, and cannot yet be differ- 
entiated  from random disturbances. Joseph Pechman considered the 
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noted  that  the recovery  of stocks after  mid-  1982  can  be directly  attributed 
to the easing of monetary  policy without  the need to appeal  to a change 
in perceptions about profitability.  He added that the relation  of stock 
prices and bond returns  is too weak to establish priors about whether 
current  stock prices are unexpectedly  strong. 
Benjamin  Friedman  emphasized that the authors'  analysis of stock 
prices relative to bond returns  is appropriate  only if bonds and equities 
are close substitutes. The empirical  evidence on this issue shows just 
the opposite, suggesting  that an increase in the supply of government 
bonds will raise the rate of return  on bonds and  lower the rate of return 
on equities. The higher  bond  rates  are  necessary  to induce  agents  to hold 
more  bonds, and  the rates  of return  to equities  are  driven  down  as agents 
diversify  out of their  bond-laden  portfolios. 
Stanley Fischer argued that the degree of international  financial 
market  integration  assumed  by the paper  is unrealistic,  and that  there is 
no evidence to support  the position  that  the interest  rate  effects of a U.S. 
deficit are offset one-for-one by a French surplus. In the same vein, 
Friedman  noted that U.S. and European  financial  assets are not very 
close  substitutes. For one thing, exchange risk cannot be avoided 
because the forward  exchange  rate  market  cannot  be used to cover long- 
term positions. Furthermore,  the covariation  of the rates of return  of 
U.S. and European  assets has historically  been low. 
Jeffrey Sachs challenged the authors' contention that higher real 
interest  rates are a worldwide  phenomenon.  Current  real rates in much 
of Europe  are not higher  than  their  average  historical  levels of the 1960s. 
Current  real  rates  in  Japan  are  due  more  to deregulation,  which  eliminated 
the extensive interest rate ceilings that had prevailed, than to any 
perceived increase in profitability.  The Japanese experience suggests 
that financial deregulation  in the United States may have played an 
important  role in current  high U.S. rates as well. Given that U.S. real 
interest  rates and deficits are both well above historical  levels, and that 
European  interest rates and deficits are not, he found it reasonable  to 
conclude that U.S.  budget deficits are influencing  U.S.  interest rate 
levels. Sachs also noted that Summers,  in a paper  which looked at one 
hundred  years of data, found that real rates are typically high in the 
immediate  aftermath  of a decline in the inflation  rate. He reasoned  that 
this fact should have been exploited in the authors' search for an 
explanation  of present U.S. rates. 